THE
MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke*

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SIGNS OF THE TIMES

A CIRCLE WHICH SHUTS HIM IN

The recent correspondence in *The Times* on country clergy was crowned on May 9th by a letter from the Rector of Great Braxted, Mr. J. W. M. Vyse, which admirably restates a principle of our Church.

'Sir,—You printed on May 3 a report of an appeal before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council against a scheme for a union of benefices in the Diocese of Chester. In your report of their Lordships' reasons for dismissing the appeal you quote Lord Jenkins as speaking of 'these two small parishes, comprising in the case of Little Leigh less than 1,000, and in the case of Lower Witley less than 500 Anglican inhabitants'. In the next sentence you quote him as referring to 'the spiritual needs of the combined Anglican population of the two parishes'.

Whatever the other grounds for or against this particular union of benefices, it is a matter for serious regret that so high an authority as the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council should thus seem to base its judgment—at least to some extent—on a view of the Anglican ministry which would appear to have no basis in tradition or indeed in law. The right of every parishioner to the use of his parish church and the ministrations of his local incumbent is balanced by a responsibility on the part of the incumbent for every single one of his parishioners—officially Anglican or not. By virtue of his institution to his benefice the incumbent has committed to him 'the cure and government of the Souls of the Parishioners of the said Parish'; and by no stretch of legal or other imagination can those words be made in this country to mean other than all who live within the boundaries of the parish.

To accept figures—notoriously hard to arrive at—for an 'Anglican population' only, even as a contributory argument in such a case as you reported, is to drive at the very heart of the Anglican priest's responsibility for all his people. Some of the letters which were written to you, quite recently, about the country parson's lot might never have been written if we had not already begun to neglect this glorious privilege of having the 'cure and care' of all—be they Jews, Turks, infidels or what have you—in favour, apparently, of ministering to a 'congregation', or even an electoral roll.'

At Ease in the Catacombs

It is even more necessary in large town parishes to heed this forthright reminder of our Church's duty. In parishes of ten or twenty thousand it were unrealistic for the vicar, often single-handed, not to serve, to a large extent, the needs and capacities of his congregation. To pretend we are still in Hooker's day and that every member of the Commonwealth is *ipso facto* a member of the Church, belongs to a cloud-cuckoo land on which younger men in especial have turned their backs. But herein lies a fatal temptation. It were equally unrealistic, in terms of the Gospel, for either the vicar or the congregation to ignore the call upon both to recognize a missionary situation in which they must together attract the whole parish to the worship and service of God. It would be salutary if every incumbent and his Parochial Church Council constantly asked, on each item of parish work and worship, Will this serve the needs and capacities of the merest beginners in the Way? Much that we cherish would have to find a secondary place. It is unfortunate that the Parish and People Movement, so excellently named, is best known for its widely successful advocacy of the Family Communion as the main Sunday service on which all resources are concentrated. How can a beginner in Anglicanism, which is not a cultus, make a start with the Communion Service? We have returned to the upper room, or to a catacomb in some parishes, but with too little regret, even with a flamboyant self-justification proper only to a sect. The original inhabitants of those cramped quarters took the earliest chance of setting forth into the world outside.

To Your Communication, O Israel!

The Times Literary Supplement of April 1st, in reviewing the unfinished and sparse autobiography of Gilbert Murray, quoted this letter from him to Lionel Curtis.

'There is one point where I possibly differ from you, and where I differ violently from Toynbee. He considers that the liberal principles of justice, co-operation, the brotherhood of man, etc., are worthless unless they are

combined with a belief in the divinity of Jesus, the Virgin Birth, and Lord knows what other bizarre and speculative beliefs. This seems to me pernicious rubbish, leading straight to a revival of the wars of religion and the persecution of heretics.'

This is Gilbert Murray in his Australian shirtsleeves, chatting as few were privileged to hear him. The phrasing is crude and a shade perverse. Yet we know from his autobiography that he went regularly to church as a boy. What is to be said for the Church's method of teaching, for its 'communication' and 'image' to use the current witch-words, which allows one of the most profound and astute minds of the age to suppose that the claim of Jesus upon himself and the world he so disinterestedly served is at one with a demand on the intelligence to accept miracles? History and science apart, such a confounding is contrary to Catholic theology. But the matter taught must be sound or the best method will fail, and the Churches have dodged the miraculous for over a century. An article in the last issue of *Theology* does a tight figure-of-eight on this thin ice with more scholarly grace than progress in any direction.

Now I Know in Part

Some thirty years ago, when a small group of ordinands raised the question of miracles publicly, one of them who is now, to be fair to our own Church, a well-known clergyman, received a letter from Thomas Hardy in which he said he had once contemplated taking Orders but found the difficulty of miracles insuperable.

There are great Deeps off these sea-coasts of Hellas and Wessex. Would our appreciation of the pagan world have been fuller, our sensibilities heightened, if Murray had professed Christianity and Hardy become a clergyman? Murray might have been more thrustingly creative, statesman rather than our sage in world affairs; but our generation would have lost the comprehensive rationality and detachment of his liberal humanism which laid bare the conditions for the rule of law in a world of many religions. One of his few bursts of anger was against a sermon preached to a conference on world law and peace, insisting that only if all turned to the Tree of Life could there come any healing of the nations. Had Hardy been ordained, the Spirit of the Years must have decamped with the Ironies and the President of the Immortals would not have had his sport with Tess. We are constrained to conclude that as God cannot be limited by His sacraments so He cannot be circumscribed even within His supremest revelation of Himself.

Murray in his later years preferred to speak of Christian rather than Western Civilization: to his precise mind it was more accurate, and there may have been something else to it. During one of his last attendances at the United Nations Association, under the shadow of a grave crisis abroad, discussion moved down spontaneously to the hidden roots

of things. Thoughtful politicians and soldiers present found themselves naturally and simply declaring that only in a return to the Christian affirmations could a final answer be found for the world. In a silence Murray intervened, in an old voice, high and quiet with an underlying passion: "There is no final answer. Our lives are a mystery, lived in a mystery. There is truth, and much truth in what has been said. But when all is said, the mystery remains." Zeal for the Christian interpretation must not burn out our reverence before the mysterious actuality it would interpret. Each can but live by the light he has, yet looking for more, till 'the eyelids of eve fall together at last'.

A Pre-emptive Bid of a Minor Suit

Many Modernists have long hoped for the day when our Church, united at least in full communion with the Free Churches, would with them be re-established as truly the Church of the nation. A current move 'to widen the basis of Establishment', as *The Church of England Newspaper* describes it, while welcome for its intent is disappointing in its proposals. An interdenominational group has been formed with the unfortunately pre-emptive title of, 'The Society for the Liberation of Religion from State Control.' The essence of its programme for this country is that the Church of England should become one denomination amongst the rest with no 'oath of supreme obedience to the State', though its ministers take no such oath as it is. Each denomination would freely order its own worship and there would be a book of public worship, to be agreed upon by the denominations and approved by Parliament, for use on national occasions such as Remembrance Day, Harvest, Christmas and Easter.

This is partial fusion at too low a flash-point to be worth its laborious preparation. Significantly, any form of the Holy Communion would be ruled out from the publicly approved book. In short, it is disestablishment for one church without any gain in unity, range or depth for any of them. We are invited to lose our tails because it is more brotherly and comfortable to adopt the Manx mode. Many County School teachers, and some thoughtful Free Church leaders, have reached the view that the Agreed Syllabus is an inadequate vehicle for the teaching of the Christian faith as understood by any of the Churches. An Agreed Handbook of Public Services, as another Residuum of the Unobjectionable, would serve us all no better. Within a generation a National Church on this basis would become but the reader of the auguries. No doubt the State would bring the rewards of divination in its hand, yet Balaam had the moral integrity to reject them. For a new ecclesiastical synthesis we must work and pray, but at an altogether higher level.

ST. PAUL AND 'HUMANISM'

By the Rev. W. F. Lofthouse, D.D.

St. Paul has often been called the first Christian theologian, and although he was more than what this term is usually supposed to mean, it is at least certain that we could not set out the main doctrines of Christian theology without St. Paul. At the same time most, if not all the existing Pauline letters are divided into two sections, the doctrinal and what we may call the ethical. Sometimes the dividing line is marked explicitly, e.g. *Gal.* v, 17. By some the Apostle has been thought, as he proceeds, to descend from a higher to a lower level, and in these days his maxims on Christian conduct might be reckoned in some quarters as the less relevant and dangerously near to 'liberalism' and 'humanism'. Forget the great doctrines, it is urged, of the Trinity, the Atonement and the Person of Christ, and the Christian Church would slip down into Unitarianism, as it has done before now; but there is little need for disagreement, and therefore for careful discussion on the importance of the two great commandments, which rest on the faith, not the faith on them.

The antithesis between doctrine and conduct, the creeds and the two commandments, is mainly a misleading one. Either side, taken by itself, will fall, as again and again it has fallen in the past. Only when taken together, can they stand. If the antithesis exists at all, it is in another form. For the majority of Christian people the doctrines are hard to grasp; but when understood, or supposed to be understood, they are easy for most of us to affirm; the rules of conduct are easy to understand; but, once understood, far from easy to carry out. It is to this point, mainly from a consideration of the Pauline epistles, that I wish to call attention.

There is another side of the antithesis. In the first or 'doctrinal' part of the epistles, the subjects of discourse differ; in the practical sections, as we may call them, the author is saying the same thing over and over. In the former sections, he is answering questions that the Churches have sent to him, or commenting on views of them that have reached him from other sources. The questions which arise, and his manner of dealing with them, lead him on from the less to the more profound levels of Christian experience. This is true of the discussions of the arrival of the Parousia (I and II *Thess.*), of the struggle between works (not the same thing as conduct) and faith (*Gal.*), and of the more elaborate formulation of Christian life and thought, dominated by grace and the Holy Spirit, leading on to the problem of the unbelieving Jews, which the apostle can only meet with an *o altitudo* (*Rom.*). Corinth sent him so many questions, and raised such agonised searchings of heart, that he is tempted to use all his time to reply to them, point by point, in spite of the magnificent achievements of I *Cor.* xiii and xv, and II *Cor.* xi. However we view *Ephesians,* it is clear that, in *Eph.*, *Phil.*, and *Col.*, he has to do with

three views as to the Person of Christ, and the relation of Christ to the organized body of his followers, the Church. Had we lost any of these, how much poorer should we have been; though richer, perhaps, could we have read the letter to the Laodiceans. Yet with all the labours of the past centuries behind us, how often we are forced to ask if we have plumbed the depths of the writer's intention.

And then we come to the second sections of the letters. Here, it would appear, there are no more questions to be answered. We can watch the apostle turning from the confusing problems through which he had led his readers to the contemplation of a special type of life, a goodness which he evidently expects from them, even if his descriptions mock its possibility. We can see it at its best and briefest in *Gal.* v, 22, the list of the fruits of the Spirit—how different from what we should have looked for in those 'fools' in Galatia. Love, joy and peace—these are involved in all his letters; but also, here, long-suffering, kindness, goodness, fidelity, meekness, endurance. These are all good Pauline words except the last (a *hapax legomenon* in the epistles, but cf. *Acts* xxiv, 25). Yet two points about each of them claim notice, and they are never explained. St. Paul seems to expect them to be greeted by his readers as already understood; and they all refer to different aspects of one and the same character. But if we accept them in theory, how rarely are they exhibited in even Christian conduct. Moreover, they are what few of us Christians (to say nothing of others) would naturally desire; yet the character they fit is exactly the character described in all these 'second halves', from the earliest to the latest.

We hear nothing of the four 'cardinal virtues', which, formulated by Plato four centuries earlier, have never been lost sight of in ethical discussions and were accepted by the Jews themselves[1]; courage, justice, self-control, and wisdom or the relation of the individual to the state as a whole; equally little about Aristotle's famous doctrine of the mean, each virtue lying between two vicious extremes. Conduct to St. Paul is no branch of politics; and with politics the Church as he envisaged it has no concern. He is thinking of his own little Christian communities round the shores of the Mediterranean, and the life he urged on those exiguous territories was to witness to the glory of God and the salvation of the world.

He begins with two rules, to which what we could call official ethics has paid little attention, but which he regards as the condition for all Christian conduct; a strict rule of chastity, and the avoidance of all quarrels, cliques, parties—the two social vices of which Paul, the strict Jew in a wicked Gentile world, was determined to get rid. These embody for him the two great negatives; 'thou shalt not'.

[1]See iv Maccabees, written probably during the first half of the first century A.D.

But the negatives, without the positives, as he knew very well, would have been of little avail. What then were the positives? Far from being content to refer to love to one's neighbour in merely general terms, or, like many of his successors, to various forms of Christian philanthropy, he advances to an analysis of the character of a society in which love, joy and peace are, so to speak, at home. This means more than the eulogies with which they have often had to be content. The member of a Christian community is one who has learnt to regard his life, his interest, and his aims from the point of view of his fellows. Whatever he does for himself, he will do it, or try to do it, for one or other of them. Their claims, their hopes, will be as sacred to him as his own. No opportunity of kindness will be missed. No injury intended by others or imagined by himself will be resented. If he has to persuade Philemon to take some unusual course of action, it will be for Philemon's sake rather than his own. Now that their interest is his, too, the Christian will expect, and not in vain, that others will look to him as he looks to them. They have become one family; and Socrates is left as far behind as Buddha or Epictetus.

In I and II *Thessalonians* the shadow of the coming Parousia is felt everywhere; all the more necessary is it that the Christian should be reminded that he must 'walk honestly to them that are without, and have need of nothing', and that none renders to anyone evil for evil, but always aims to 'follow after that which is good, to support the weak, being long-suffering toward all'. 'If any obeyeth not our word, yet count his not as an enemy, but admonish him as a brother' (I, iv, 11 f; v, 10 f, II, iii, 13 ff). So in *Galatians*: ever be servants one to another; 'bear ye one another's burdens, and so fulfil the law of Christ'. Let us work for that which is good toward all men; and 'let us not be weary in well doing' (v, 14; vi, 2, 9-10).

In I and II *Cor.* the distinction is less clearly marked. I *Cor.* xiii could be taken as St. Paul's own exposition of *Gal.* v, 22, and illustrations from the new idea of conduct appear everywhere; e.g., 'it is altogether a defect in you that you have law-suits one with another; why not rather suffer wrong? Why not rather be defrauded?' (I, vi, 7 f, cf. *Mt.* v, 23 ff). Away with what makes it impossible for you Corinthians to eat the Lord's Supper together (I, xi, 20); and it is a characteristic Pauline trait that the great chapter on the resurrection (I, xv) ends with the demand that believers should be always about the Lord's work. Christians are a new creation. The appeal of his own life is urged also on them, resting on the meekness and gentleness of Christ (II, v, 17; vi, 5-10, 13; x, 1). In *Romans,* the contrast in *Gal.* v, 16 reappears in the crowded chapters xii-xv. The use of the body itself in the service of the community is the one and only sacrifice left to the Christian (xii, 1); it means, for example, obedience to the command not to think of oneself more highly than one is entitled to

think (xii, 3) and in honour to 'prefer one another'; it implies the regulation even of our diet (xiv, 15 f) and in general the searching principle that 'we who are strong owe it as a debt to bear the infirmities of the weak' (xv, 1).

In *Eph.* iv, the rules for conduct are the same; they demand 'all lowliness and meekness with long-suffering. Let all bitterness and wrath with anger and clamour be put away from you (iv, 31 f)'. 'Be ye kind to one another, tender-hearted, forgiving one another.' The great rule of married life is derived from the self-giving of Christ for the Church (*Eph.* v, 23-33, one of St. Paul's noblest passages). This is repeated in *Col.* iii, 8 ff: for husbands and wives; masters and slaves. The whole letter to Philippians is punctuated with it, 'in lowliness of mind each counting the other better than himself', 'do all things without murmurings or disputings;' 'and let your forbearance be made known unto all men' (ii, 3 f; iv, 5 f; forbearance clearly implies claiming less than your rights).

Thus, all through, Paul is saying the same thing; and we cannot but notice that such a view of conduct leaves behind it the two questions which have beset all our ethical discussions; for self or for others? And, on what authority? As regards the first, the thought of interest, the individual's self-interest as we might say, is neither condemned nor criticized. 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour,' as the commandment is stated in *Leviticus* and repeated some half a dozen times in the Gospels, 'as thou lovest thyself'. There is no 'moral conflict' between the two; no suggestion that the good man must learn to say, 'I want to do this; but I must do that'. 'I should like to keep my place; but I must give it up to another'. It is the attitude which is changed. The good man's interest is still in what he does; can any of us place it anywhere else? All depends on what the interest is. Here, it is no longer a call to conflict, to be obeyed or defied. It has become one with its rival; the foes have become friends. The secret, known in all true wedlock and parenthood, is now seen to be applicable to the life of the whole community. The Christian has learnt to say, 'what I aim at is neither my interest nor his; it is ours'. 'Selfishness', as we call it, is neither to be affirmed nor buried; it is simply not there.[2]

But is this possible? Surely it is not, apart from St. Paul's answer to the second question, on what authority? The apostle often writes as if the question could not arise, as if, in spite of all the discussions in well-worn ethical text-books, he is simply intent on pressing home, in letter after letter, the importance of the fruits of the spirit, and certain that, whatever his readers have made of the earlier paragraphs of his letters, they will follow him here. And, strangely enough, he is right. The good man, as St. Paul understands goodness, like the rest of us, seldom asks

[2]This lies behind the answer to the question in *Rom.* vii, 22 ff.

for an answer. Unheard voices answer the unspoken questions. So it is with St. Paul himself. He, too, knows the standards he will conform to; the models he will imitate; the silent voice of the Christ within. And through Christ, believers have found their way into the household of Christ, the Church. In that household masters and servants are as one. They no more look for an authority than the child questions the authority of his father.

But where did the apostle learn all this, which he thus takes for his disciples and himself as all but axiomatic? Certainly not from the moral guides of his own or any other period. He is as far from Plato as from Kant. Whence his assurance of what other eyes had not seen nor ears heard? The answer is clear; from Jesus. To-day, the study of the Synoptics, to say nothing of the Fourth Gospel, has often led its followers into wandering mazes. But as to the type of life there delineated, there is no uncertainty whatsoever. Dialectical victory the gospels may withhold; assurance on conduct is open to every reader.

To elaborate this briefly, it will be enough to refer to the author of the first gospel. Whatever his date and his relation to the other two, he gives as a summary of Christian conduct as it grew up in the half century after the crucifixion. The points of difference between him and the other two only bring out the likenesses. Our perplexities often blind us to the extreme difficulty of either inventing or even describing such a character as Jesus claimed to be, a difficulty plain to the readers of Renan in the last century or Goguel in this. The success of the Gospels in their picture of one who was at once the Son of Man and the Son of God, without a trace of the smug, the prig, the hypocrite or the bore, is unique in literature.

The Beatitudes might almost be taken as the evangelical equivalent of *Gal.* v, 22, but with outspoken emphasis on what St. Paul everywhere implies. How happy it is to be poor in spirit, meek, tearful, hungry for righteousness, and even persecuted. Jesus is showing, to state it colloquially, how silly it is to follow the Pharisee in acquiring a piety that can be advertised. Yield, rather than contend; give to those who cannot return the gift or the invitation; what merit is there in anything else? Throw away whatever hinders such an ideal, but never resent a wrong. Only as the disciple takes up his cross can he follow his Master or be worthy of Him. (*Mt.* v, 25; x, 38; xvi, 24). The twelve are sent out as sheep among wolves. Jesus glories that the secrets of the Kingdom are hidden from the wise and revealed to children (xi, 25). After all the commands have been kept, the disciple must be ready to sell all he has so as to find treasure in heaven (xix, 21; xviii, 7 f). In such uncompromising ways must love be shown, or it is worth nothing. It is the way the Master himself went. Greatness can only be gained by service, even the most menial (*Jn.* xiii). Jesus attracted wide if spasmodic enthusiasm by his 'miracles', as we call

them; faith may even remove a mountain. But it is the attitude behind the deed that He laboured constantly to enforce. Few may work miracles; all can learn the lore of triumphant and royal service. Against such there is no law; but few care to travel along the narrow road.

Nothing can be more striking than the calm assurance with which Jesus places Himself at the centre of the disciple's life. From Jesus the disciple draws his standards, his authority, his joy and his power. Did Saul of Tarsus know anything of Jesus in the days of his flesh? We cannot tell. He gives only one *agraphon*. But the allusions to his life and words are constant in the epistles, and still more the fact that he based his whole conception of the new life on Jesus. His followers might have no memories of Jesus on earth, nor interest in others who had. But they had at least learnt the meaning of the righteousness of God in Christ, the perfect relation of obedience and confidence between the Father and the Son into which they had been drawn (*Jn.* xvii, 21 f).

A few references will make this clear. 'We receive one another as Christ also received us' (*Rom.* xv, 7); 'for even Christ pleased not Himself'. 'It is through the God of all patience and comfort that we can be of the same mind one with another, according to Christ Jesus' (ib. 3f). 'So I take pleasure in weakness and injuries for Christ's sake' (II *Cor.* xii, 10). 'It is they who are of Christ Jesus who have crucified the flesh with the affections and lusts thereof' (*Gal.* v, 24). 'Subjecting yourselves to one another in the fear of Christ' (*Eph.* v, 21); we forgive 'even as God for Christ's sake forgave us' (*Eph.* iv, 32). St. Paul pressed on 'to take hold of that for which he had been taken hold of by Christ Jesus'. (*Phil.* iii, 12; it is noteworthy how in nearly all these passages the double name of the Saviour is used). 'We are to seek things that are above, compassion, humility, kindness, etc., because we died, and are risen, with Christ' (*Col.* iii, 1 ff). This is surely the genuine Christology of St. Paul; we imitate Christ; Christ reproduces Himself in us; God in Christ is our past, present, and future. It is as if St. Paul had been in the company of the apostles who heard the Dominical words, 'I have left you an example'. 'I can do all things through Christ which strengtheneth me' (*Phil.* iv, 13). And what is possible thus, for him, is thus, and only thus, possible for ourselves.

One last word. It is love, but love in the sense of *Mt.* v and *Gal.* v, that is essential to all Christian life. Without it orthodoxy is valueless. But where is it to be found? In all the centuries of Christian history, in Popes, in 'Most Christian Kings', and not seldom in leaders of Church Councils, one looks in vain for the Christian attitude that would find others in oneself and oneself in others. *De nobis fabula.* But is it in truth practicable? The world did not need Darwin's hypothesis of the struggle for existence—which is so often set before us as scientifically indubitable—to be convinced that such a struggle is universal. Is the Christianity that

we have been describing to be shattered on this reef? Christianity, we are often told, has not failed; it has never been tried. This may be true for the great and mighty, even in the Church. *Eppur se muove*. It is still alive, and as vigorous, it would seem, as ever it was. Today, where a hundred longings and frustrations tear at men's hopes and fears, Christianity offers the one vision of salvation. There are no 'Morrison's pills', as Carlyle called them, in the world, or in the New Testament. But let us suppose that there are Christian churches and communities of men and women who take themselves and their Master seriously enough to live by this rule, we shall find that these churches, as the New Testament seldom asserts, but everywhere implies, attract attention, enrol outsiders, and thus affect public standards and conduct. And to-day we are finding fresh signs of a change. For example, the principles of the older 'colonisation' hardly dare even to stand on the defensive. But that the strong must bear the burdens of the weak is recognized, even though it leads for the time to no more than lip-service.

This is not a matter however for statesmen or ecclesiastics or journalists. It is for ourselves. There is nothing in the sacred writings to suggest that we can wait for someone else to begin. It is for all of us, or it will be for none. Perhaps, after all, the folly of men is the wisdom of God.

LIVES IN THE CHURCH

1. Cyril Forster Garbett

Some men make arrangements for their funerals; some make arrangements for their biographies. Archbishop Garbett left instructions about his biography: 'I hope the author will try to give a picture of myself with all my faults and failings. . . . I want it to be honest and not mere panegyric.' The Archbishop's wishes have been faithfully fulfilled by Canon Charles Smyth, whose official Life of Cyril Forster Garbett[1] adds yet another distinguished volume to the library of outstanding ecclesiastical biographies.

Canon Smyth's achievement is all the greater when it is remembered that his subject is neither attractive nor important. Garbett was a stern, austere, dedicated man; industrious but uninspired. His achievement was 90 per cent perspiration. He was a glutton for work and felt depressed and ill at ease when war-time 'blackout' and petrol rationing interfered with his laborious routine. As Vicar of Portsea, his large staff had little easy intimacy with their master. There was no feeling of home in the Portsea Clergy House over which he ruled. He was a distant, lonely figure, inspiring respect but little affection. So, too, he was a lonely Bishop of Southwark where, perhaps, he did his best work as a Diocesan administrator. But he was too formidable to be popular, and he lacked geniality. When he was Bishop of Winchester, Wolvesey 'was not the kind of home where you would ever dare to ask for a second helping', for the Bishop was itching to get back to his work. Here, too, he had periods of acute mental depression, especially when deprived of a domestic chaplain.

There was, however, an attractive side to his character, and Canon Smyth does full justice to it. He had no illusions about himself; he knew his own limitations. When Temple went to Canterbury, Garbett records in his diary his own lack of the intellectual ability that should be possessed by an archbishop. 'I know I am not equal to it.' At bottom there was a deep and redeeming humility in the man. He was dignified but without a trace of pomposity. He generally managed to forget his decorations at banquets. Though he cultivated good relations with the Press, with the business men in the North, and with his colleagues in the House of Lords, he never for one moment courted popularity.

As a record of the development of Garbett's character, Canon Smyth's biography is superb. As a monument to the Archbishop's achievement, the book leaves one wondering whether Garbett's long innings adds up to very much of lasting value. At his Enthronement in York Minster,

[1] *Cyril Forster Garbett, Archbishop of York*, by Canon Charles Smyth. (Hodder and Stoughton; 35/-.)

Garbett preached on the three great aims: Evangelism, Church Reform—and Reunion. In the sphere of Evangelism he probably did his best work indirectly, by his advocacy of housing reform and by his contributions to House of Lords debates and in public addresses; all of which helped to relate the Church and the Christian message to the social questions of the day. In the sphere of Church reform, Garbett's proposals, embodied in his book, *Church and State in England*, were partly prompted by his fear of the growth of a totalitarian régime. The fear was exaggerated, but even if it ever proved to be well founded, the reforms Garbett proposed would be totally inadequate to save the Church from the molestation of totalitarian rule. Garbett admitted that 'at present the Church has great freedom in practice but little in theory, we must be careful not to gain unlimited freedom in the abstract, but very little in the concrete'. Garbett's proposals for amending the procedure for the appointment of Bishops, or modifying the relations of Church Assembly and Parliament, and for a new final Court of Appeal, might well destroy the real freedom which the Church enjoys in practice in return for a limited freedom in theory.

Garbett was Chairman of the Canon Law Commission which initiated the task of the revision of Canon Law on which the Convocations have been at work for over ten years. Canon Smyth is strangely reticent about this aspect of Garbett's work, and makes only a brief allusion to it. In so far as there has ever been any enthusiasm for this task, it was Garbett who was in the van. Already there are 'off the record' murmurings to be heard among bishops and others that it might have been wiser not to have embarked on this tortuous procedure where the fruits are likely to be incommensurate with the labours. In all this work, Garbett was the episcopal driving force. Here, at least, he was a leader. It remains to be seen whether he was not leading us up the garden path.

Although he travelled widely as an ambassador of the Church, and was Chairman of the Church of England Missionary Council and an active Vice-President of the International Missionary Council, Garbett made little contribution to the cause of Christian reunion. He was never a leader in the ecumenical sphere. His High Church instincts made him recoil at any attempt to force the pace toward reunion with Nonconformists. He saw little value in inviting Nonconformist ministers to preach in Anglican churches.

As a pastoral administrator, Garbett was well endowed with commonsense, but there was little of the liberal spirit. He was particularly hostile towards any of his clergy who took a service of blessing after a Registry Office marriage for divorced persons. When a proposal was made in Convocation to authorise such services, Garbett records: 'It is an attempt at the appeasement of the liberals at the cost of the self-respect of the Church of England. Persistent compromise is the curse of the Anglican

episcopate. This compromising weakness makes me sometimes despair of the Church of England.'

In spite of this outburst, Garbett was through and through a Church of England man. His book, *The Claims of the Church of England*, is his best work. It was planned and written to offset Hensley Henson's book on *The Church of England*, which Garbett thought 'brilliantly written and full of good things, but far too negative'. Garbett brought to his task wide reading, long experience, and deep devotion. Here is the fruit of his lifetime of unrelenting labour in the service of the Church he loved. It will be, perhaps, his one abiding monument.

By natural aptitude he was an administrator; his inner desire was to be a pastor. Administrators are little loved and soon forgotten. Readers of Canon Smyth's notable biography will respect Garbett the administrator, but they will learn to revere 'the great intercessor' (for such he was) and to love the man who learned to drive a car at the age of 65 so as to be able to visit bombed parishes without delay. So, too, they will admire the Archbishop who was always trying to make time to visit more of the clergy in their homes. What a pity that this austere, lonely, dedicated man, did not feel more at home when he had rung the vicarage bell.

W. G. Fallows

2. Ronald Knox

As the author explains in his preface, the primary purpose of this biography[2] is to tell the story of Ronald Knox's exterior life as objectively as possible. Evelyn Waugh is to be congratulated on a remarkable achievement. Ronald Knox was the son of an Anglican bishop of a frankly Protestant outlook: he possessed the most brilliant mind of his generation, and in the days of his maturity was received into the Roman Catholic Church, of which he remained a devoted priest until his death from a malignant cancer in 1957. Of such a man a completely objective biography cannot be written, but Waugh, although a faithful papist, gives a just picture of Bishop Knox, and is equally sympathetic to both father and son when he comes to narrate the final separation caused by Ronald's defection to Rome. 'With Ronald's defection in the balance there was nothing this pair could say to one another that did not exacerbate the feelings of dread and remorse. Each in the love he bore the other, felt impelled to argument, often so painful that it had to be pursued by notes left on the hall-table. Ronald explained his position to his father, and they parted in despair of reconciliation' (p. 151). With equal detachment Waugh reveals the suffering and frustration which the Roman authorities dealt out to their brilliant and sensitive convert who was ready to place all his rich gifts at their service. As soon as he was

[2] *The Life of Ronald Knox*, by Evelyn Waugh. (Chapman & Hall; 30/-.)

ordained he was posted by Cardinal Bourne to St. Edmund's Ware. The cardinal had set his heart on making the institution into a fashionable Roman Catholic public school and considered that the addition of Knox to his staff would further his aim. 'Knox was engaged to teach Latin, his wages £30 a year.' Waugh admits that he was kept there too long and that the work was greatly below his capacity. 'The internal state of the college caused him great distress' (p. 175). Waugh also quite frankly reveals the opposition and frustration Knox suffered at the hands of the hierarchy when he had embarked on a new translation of the Vulgate. 'The Roman Church,' Fawkes once remarked, 'is a very business-like institution.' Its leaders are not selected for their spiritual sensitiveness and sympathy, but for their prudence. Cleverness even when yoked to loyalty is suspect to them.

Fr. D'Arcy in his panegyric summed up his achievements as (1) ensuring the word Roman in Roman Catholic to be no longer felt as foreign, and (2) the translation of the Vulgate as the great work of his life. 'Honestly, I look on the Roman priesthood as the grave of the talent that is especially yours' (p. 152). This was his father's judgment. No one outside the Roman Church can help but wonder whether the latter judgment was not proved true, and how it all came about. Ronald Knox came up to Balliol in 1906 'in a throng of friends' who had known one another since the age of thirteen at Eton (and many since the age of eight at Summer Fields), most of whom were content to live together undiluted for the whole of their Oxford lives. Added to social exclusiveness which Eton had stamped upon them as a group, they excelled all other members of the college in both intellectual and athletic capacity. 'They talked well. All of them loved poetry and many of them wrote it. Several had outstanding good looks' (p. 83). Ronald had the most brilliant intellect of them all. As is well known, they almost all fell in the 1914—1918 war. They were perhaps the most distinguished group of young men which what is now termed the establishment has ever produced. Yet in some sense they were hot-house plants. Bernard Shaw later was to call them the dwellers of Heartbreak House and compared them to the cultivated intelligentsia of Czarist Russia. Their intellectual life to us appears to have lacked any real contact with reality. Their education was almost completely formal and literary. They were unaware of the scientific method and what its employment was preparing for Europe. Their boyhood and youth were spent in large country houses, and their parents belonged to that upper crust of English society which, for want of a better name (because it was never a rigid caste), has to be called the governing class. They were quite out of touch with the mass of average men who, untrained to school their passions, had to live close to nature in a continuous struggle and labour for a livelihood. Ronald Knox in a large measure lacked the family background which supplied

to the others that sense of spiritual security needed by those who, by birth and education, have been cut off from nature's world. His mother died when he was three years old and, although Ronald spent what he remembered as four years of untroubled happiness with an uncle in Lincolnshire, his biographer writes, 'Those who knew him best in later life, the mothers especially of the children in whom he delighted, discerned in his zest for spontaneous love and for the intimacies of a vicarious family life something of the uncertainty, loneliness, and persistent hunger of the heart which spring from a motherless childhood' (p. 38-9).

His life affords a glaring example of the shortcomings of a purely literary and classical education without any training in scientific method. He discovered that formally contradictory systems can be constructed from the same facts according to one's preliminary assumptions. Hence he despised the apparatus, conclusions, and hypotheses of higher criticism. He failed to obtain his first in Honour Moderations because he could not be bothered with Wilamowitz. He answered *Foundations*, the essays of seven liberal Oxford theologians who were trying to reconcile Christian theology with Bradley's philosophic idealism, with *Some Loose Stones*, published in 1913. 'It was partly an assertion that "the speculations of critics are hypotheses based on *a posteriori* evidence and as such in their very nature uncertain" ' (p. 113). Ronald Knox never recognised that all real knowing begins with somewhat wild guesses suggested by some clue in a confused mass of data. As for so many others the quest for certainty led to Rome, the mother who within the shelter of her authority provides a home both for the rootless intellect and the craven spirit. His father pleaded that he was going to bury his talent. His prediction proved true. Although his translation of the Vulgate is not likely to be surpassed, yet a translation of the Vulgate it remains, encompassed within the restrictions on scholarship and criticism prescribed by the papacy. It will be recalled that Anchises dismissed Aeneas at the gate of dreams. Perhaps if the Bishop had regarded his son's apostasy to Rome as a resort to dreamland where he might enjoy a rest for a season, the spiritual Aeneid would not have been written.

H. C. Snape

ONWARD CHRISTIAN SOLDIERS*

By the Rev. A. Tindal Hart, D.D.

'The wind bloweth where it listeth and thou hearest the voice thereof, but knoweth not whence it cometh or whither it goeth: so is everyone that is born of the Spirit.' St. John iii, 8.

Various theories are held concerning the progress of History. Spengler believed that it moved in circles, a new cycle growing out of the old. Then there are the escalators, who maintain that by and large each Age is better than the last, and we are steadily evolving towards some form of perfectionism. Personally, I am rather inclined to agree with the Archdeacon of Newark in his latest book, *Sparrows of the Spirit,* that the only lesson we are likely to learn from History is that we can learn nothing from it. Nevertheless, if one takes a broad, comprehensive and impartial survey of Church History, it becomes apparent that it does follow roughly a pattern of Revolution and Reaction. To-day, as far as the Church of England is concerned at any rate, we are passing through a period of Reaction. Let me explain what I mean. The Church of Christ, as I think we would all agree, was launched at Pentecost as a Revolutionary Movement of the First Magnitude in the teeth of the official Churches of that time, both Jewish and Pagan. It swept across the Roman World and was eventually adopted by Constantine the Great as the Established Religion of that Empire. Since then there has been a series of similar, if smaller, Movements within the Church itself, which were at first bitterly opposed by Authority, but eventually accepted and absorbed, and gave new life and vigour to Christianity as a whole, just when it was becoming stagnant or reactionary. As far as this country is concerned, there was the rise of the Monastic System, the Coming of the Friars, the Lollard Heresy, the Puritan Revolution, the Evangelical Revival, the Oxford Movement and, last but not least, the Liberal Advance. Liberalism reached its peak in the years immediately following the First World War, when people were still dreaming of a War to end War, a country fit for heroes to live in, and an effective League of Nations. Their disillusionment bred Reaction. Authoritarianism crept in; parties consolidated, policies hardened, expansion ceased, contraction began. Spasmodic efforts to break out and break new ground have indeed been made, but with scant success. There was Archbishop Lang's *Recall to Religion*, which fell on deaf ears, partly because he himself had blotted his copy-book over the Abdication. There was the famous Report, *Towards the Conversion of England*, which came out at the end of the Second World War, but which, despite much publicity and the staging of some spectacular Missions—notably that in London under Bishop Wand—somehow never really got out of the printed page and into real life. These were officially inspired. But there have been unofficial ones

*An address delivered in Ripon Hall Chapel on Friday, February 19th, 1960.

too: The Oxford Groupists, who made such a splash in the 'thirties; or the more recent Billy Graham Campaigns. None has done more than scratch the surface of society. Meanwhile, contraction goes steadily on, affecting every aspect of Church life and religious thought. Let us have a look at what is happening. C.A.C.T.M., plus the training of the average Theological College, are producing between them a mass-produced type of ordination candidate, who, by and large, can be depended upon to accept the status quo and not to deviate in any marked degree from the official line. Economic and bureaucratic pressures are being brought to bear upon the parochial clergy for the same purpose. The Convocations and Church Assembly are being used as instruments to shackle Ecclesia Anglicana with a uniform system of dogma, liturgy, ceremonial and behavourism. The popular and much advertised Biblical Theology is being exploited as a screen to escape from our plain Christian duty of pursuing the Truth unflinchingly, however unpalatable it may prove. Finally, whilst paying loud lip-service to the paramount need for reunion with other Christian denominations, the present authorities in the Church of England so hedge themselves round with safeguards and prohibitions that they render any such comprehension schemes practically incapable of realization. Nothing, for instance, could be more ridiculous than to try and foist bishops upon the Church of Scotland or to deny the validity of their sacraments.

Moreover, this growing contraction, this hardening of Anglican arteries, is steadily driving a wedge between clergy and people, the priesthood and the laity. There is as yet, thank heaven, little anti-clericalism in this country; but a good deal of indifference, frustration, and exasperation. At a meeting of the Church Union a few months ago, a spokesman is reported to have said that one pope at a distance was better than a pope in each diocese. He might well have gone further and said: a pope in each parish. For in all too many benefices to-day, especially country villages, the incumbent is often acting in a high-handed and tyrannical manner. His belief in his vocation, his training, the uncompromising dogmas of the Church, all encourage him to think that he is always right, and his parishioners, when they oppose him, always wrong. Consequently all too many parish churches tend to become incumbents' chapels, from which the bulk of his people are excluded, and the precious few—also all too precious—are alone catered for. This attitude, in its more extreme form, has been defended by Fr. Martin Thornton in his book, *Pastoral Theology: A Reorientation*; but the havoc such theories can wreak, when put into practice, has to be seen to be believed. These little 'popes', nevertheless, conveniently forget that the parish church, chancel now as well as nave, belongs to these same parishioners, whom they are casting into outer darkness.

As a result of all these symptoms of reaction I have briefly outlined,

there is a steady drift from the Anglican Church to-day, a silent drift, a slow drift, but a steady one. Considerably less than ten per cent of the entire population of England attend the services of the Established Church. Can this really be a source of satisfaction to our ecclesiastical pundits, who in season and out of season proclaim complacently that the Church is always right?

Each of the great new Religious Movements I spoke of earlier had its origin and focus point in some particular locality, as for instance at Lutterworth Rectory or Oriel College, Oxford. If a fresh upsurge was to start to-day, might it not emanate from Ripon Hall? Ripon Hall has always had a tradition for turning out some big men; not necessarily successful men by any means, as the world counts success; but men with big ideas, a fearless approach to the Church's problems, and a generous comprehensive spirit. 'In a small Church,' wrote Hensley Henson, 'you will find small men.' And that is exactly what we are getting now, from the episcopal bench to the parochial cure. Zealous, hard-working, conscientious Christian-minded men no doubt, but nonentities for whom Agnostic England—the vast majority of our fellow-countrymen—has no thought and no time.

Far be it from me to prophesy when and where the Wind of the Spirit will blow. But History goes to show that when it does the men it catches up and carries along with it are not simply men of faith, courage and integrity—that can be taken for granted—but those who are not afraid of being labelled 'eccentric', 'irresponsible', 'unrespectable', 'dangerous'. Men who, like our Lord himself, are prepared if necessary to scrap pharisaic jargon and tradition, and make a clean fresh start; or like Nelson at Copenhagen, when their timid superiors beat the retreat, put their blind eye to the signal. Do not misunderstand me. We are all bound by authority to obey our pastors and masters, our bishops and archbishops, in all things lawful and honest. The Church of England is our home and we would not wish to change it. But it sadly needs a cleansing wind; and should it begin to blow through us, should the call come to us, let us not be afraid of it or ashamed of it or scared of what others may say or do; answering boldly: 'Here am I, send me.'

I should like to end this address with two quotations, from Robert Browning and William Shakespeare. Robert Browning wrote in *The Grammarian's Funeral*:

> 'This small man with a little thing to do, sees it and does it.
> That high man with a great thing to pursue, dies ere he knows it.'

Hamlet said:

> 'The Times are out of joint;
> Ah, cursed Spite
> That ever I was born to set them right.'

Let us, with none of Hamlet's doubts and fears, rather thank God that he has called us to such a task in our generation.

METHODS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION AND THEOLOGY OF ANDERS NYGREN

By the Rev. P. W. Russell, M.A.

The purpose of this paper[1] is the strictly limited one of presenting Bishop Nygren's point of view with a minimum of comment, since his work, though it has had considerable influence on the Continent and in Scandinavia, has not been able to make any great impact here. Few of his books are available in English, and the philosophical and systematic works which are the background to 'Agape and Eros'[2] for example, have not yet been translated, though there is hope that this may be remedied in the future.

I

Nygren's chief concern in the discussion of method in the theological disciplines is that it shall be objective and scientific. The term 'scientific' is used here to translate the Swedish 'vetenskaplig' (cf. German 'wissenschaftlich'), and is not associated with the popular limitation of the term to natural science, with the implied possibility of prediction. Theology must be a scientific discipline in the sense that the presuppositions made and the methods used must not be arbitrary. 'Theology' Nygren affirms 'is a necessary link in a chain of necessities that interlock leaving no room at any point for the arbitrary. The beginning of the chain is the point where the philosophy of religion anchors religion in the life of the spirit generally by showing that that life is only possible on the basis of religion.'[3]

Accordingly we shall begin the presentation of Nygren's theological method with his philosophy of religion.

II

For Nygren the only function that a scientific philosophy can have is analytical. There cannot be a 'scientific world view' for there cannot be a view without a given standpoint, and there is no scientific reason why one standpoint should be preferred to another. Such a world view may have a valid and useful place in our cultural life, but it cannot be the foundation of a scientific philosophy. The task of such a philosophy

[1]This is a shortened version of a paper delivered by the author to the Society for the Study of Theology, at Nottingham, in April, 1959.

[2]A. Nygren, *Agape and Eros* (Revised Edition, London 1953), translated by Philip S. Watson. Original Title *Den Kristna Kärlekstanken Genom Tiderna*. On this point see pp. 34-44.

[3]A. Nygren, *Filosofi och Motivforskning* (Stockholm 1940), p. 183. This collection of essays was approved by Nygren along with other works as fairly representing his thought for the purposes of the original paper.

is not construction but 'the critical examination of the general principles of experience; it must be stressed that there is no question here of ontological principles, but quite simply the unavoidable logical principles that are inherent in all knowledge and all idea of validity'.[4] 'It is the fundamental concepts used by other sciences, but examined by none, that philosophy makes the object of its critical examination. Without using such fundamental ideas as true and false, reality, necessity, causality, etc. etera, no science can get anywhere.'[5] The object of philosophy is to test the validity of concepts and presuppositions used in all science and presupposed in all experience.

Nygren distinguishes two forms of philosophical analysis, the analysis of concepts and the analysis of presuppositions. 'The method of analysis of concepts can help us on the way by testing what are offered as principles or fundamental concepts.'[6] It can lead to a negative or a positive result by showing that the ideas involved and the elements forming a particular concept do or do not form a consistent whole, but it is a limited method. 'This analysis can show that a concept is free from contradiction, but not that it is a fundamental concept.'[7] To discover what are fundamental concepts we must use what Nygren calls 'the transcendental method'. The term 'transcendental' is borrowed from Kant, and owes nothing to the post-Kantian transcendental philosophy; Nygren elsewhere refers to it as 'the logical analysis of presuppositions'. Its object is to establish valid principles. If, for example, we are dealing with the principle of causality, the question here is not what is actually meant by the concept of causality, but what logical presuppositions are implicit in its use. 'What has been presupposed, consciously or unconsciously, whenever a causal relationship is asserted.'[8]

Nygren's method, in its application to religion has been summed up thus: 'What Nygren calls "the transcendental deduction of the fundamental category of religion" is a fairly simple and essentially negative reasoning. There is no demonstration of any reality, nor of the truth of the content of any religious statement. The typical formula is as follows: If this and that are not valid, then it is meaningless to talk about anything at all as valid; therefore this and that must be valid. 'If we can prove that one thing must be valid if we are to speak of validity at all, then we have arrived at a measure of validity which cannot be surpassed. The transcendental deduction can best be compared to a negative proof.

[4] *Ibid.* p. 17.
[5] *Ibid.* p. 17.
[6] *Ibid.* p. 27
[7] *Ibid.* p. 27
[8] *Ibid.* p. 28. Compare on this point A. Nygren, *Portents and Prospects in Theology,* in *The Christian Century,* July 1958 (Chicago).

It seeks to prove that no validity and no experience can exist unless this axiom is acknowledged.'[9]

The transcendental method takes us beyond our given experience, not to a transcendent reality, but to its logical principles and presuppositions. 'Only that of which it can be said that there can be no experience and no validity unless it is accepted, is valid as a philosophical principle or ultimate presupposition.'[10] 'Thus we achieve the possibility of a scientific study of principles. We are no longer tied to the arbitrary and unverifiable assertions of principle found in metaphysics, but have a critical yardstick with which to measure and test them.'[11]

III

While applying Kant's critical method to religion, Nygren rejects his treatment of religion, of which he had an inadequate understanding. Nygren attempts to show that a positive attitude must be taken to the fundamental religious category. In this we have a difficulty that is not found in any other branch of the life of the spirit; scepticism about the fundamental categories excludes one from the communities in which these categories are acknowledged. Thus scepticism about the category of truth and falsehood excludes one from the scientific community which makes the search for truth its object, and scepticism about the ethical or aesthetic categories involves a similar exclusion, which no one desires. Religious scepticism, on the other hand, excludes us only from the religious community, and this is for many people a matter of indifference, since the religious community is not productive, but rather receptive. To show, therefore, that religion, or rather the religious *a priori,* the fundamental category of religion, is necessary, we have to show that it is necessary beyond the sphere of religion. It is not enough to show that religious experience is possible and valid; we have the further task of showing that without the fundamental category of religion, no experience of any kind is valid.

Religions, as historically given, claim to raise life above the given, sensible, finite sphere. The existence of Buddhism, for example, as an—at least in its classic form—atheistic religion, excludes God as the fundamental religious category, but all religions claim to confront man with

[9]Gustaf Wingren, *Theology in Conflict,* (Edinburgh 1958), translated by Eric H. Wahlstrom, original title, *Teologiens Metodfraga* (Lund 1954), p. 5, quoting A. Nygren, *Religiöst Apriori* (Lund 1921), p. 209. As an introduction to Nygren's thought, this should be taken with reservations. It has been comprehensively rebutted by Nygren in a debate in the Swedish Theological Quarterly. It is unfortunate that this criticism of Nygren's work should have been published in English before much of what is criticized was available to English readers.

[10]*Filosofi och Motivforskning,* p. 31.

[11]*Ibid.* pp. 29f.

the eternal, and it is the eternal that Nygren finds to be the fundamental category of religion, the religious *a priori*. The fundamental category is not the whole content of religion, for while all religious experience presupposes eternity—that which is beyond the sensible sphere—the content of that experience is not hereby determined.

Furthermore, the claim of other forms of the spiritual life to make valid judgments also presuppose this category. Science, ethics and aesthetics claim that truth, goodness and beauty are valid independently of space and time, and this independence of space and time, the presupposition of their validity, is found only in eternity, and that is the category with which religion deals. The eternal validity which science, art and morality claim is only to be found in religion.

We must be clear here that Nygren is not confusing eternity as a presupposition of thought, and the pregnant ideas of eternity found in historical religions. All religious experience, professing to be a pregnant experience of eternity, presupposses the categorical idea of eternity, and all religious judgments contain an affirmation about eternity. The judgments of science, ethics and aesthetics presuppose this category, but are not affirmations about it. Nygren is not saying that the concept of eternal validity necessitates belief in God, but that both belief in God and this concept presuppose independence of space and time. It is a matter of fact that many people have only been able to give meaning to the concept of eternal validity by referring it to God, and that in one historically given answer to this problem, therefore, we are brought up against the concept of eternity as found in religion. The idea of a validity that is independent of space and time presupposes the basic religious category, but does not thereby entail belief in any of the historic religions where this category is given content. Nygren is clear that it is in no sense the task of philosophy of religion to 'prove' the existence of God. 'It is self-contradictory either to wish to prove that God does exist, or to prove that he does not. Neither of these has anything to do with philosophy as a scientific discipline.'[12]

The object of the argument up to this point is the anchoring of the 'chain of necessities' in the life of the spirit generally, and it must be pointed out that even if this is not wholly successful it does not invalidate what follows about method in theology.

IV

A further link in the chain is the establishment of theology as an objective discipline. This claim has been challenged on the ground that theology—by which we usually mean Christian theology—presupposes its object; it accepts Christianity as valid, and this acceptance is said to

[12]Article in *Christian Century* cited above.

invalidate the claim of theology to be scientific. Nygren distinguishes three ways in which this position is stated: it is said (1) that religion is an illusion, (2) that religion is a subjectively conditioned reality, and (3) that the task of theology must be to establish the validity of Christianity —that this must be its conclusion rather than its presupposition.

All these views draw conclusions from the nature of religion to the nature of the science that studies it. If religion is an illusion (1. above) this is justified, for we cannot build up a science on a purely arbitrary basis. But this view is refuted if we have shown that religion is an indispensible form of experience by the transcendental analysis outlined above. The philosophy of religion establishes the objectivity of religion *as far as is possible by philosophical means.* This is sufficient to refute all thought of illusion.

The second view calls religion a subjectively conditioned reality, by which is meant that it can only be experienced by a particular subject, but this is true of all experience. A strict methodology can still preserve the objective character of theology in this case, as it does in the case of psychology, which uses the methods of natural science to study purely psychical phenomena.

In the third view the subjectivity of theology is asserted on the grounds that it makes a value judgment about Christianity. Both these last two views use the term 'subjective' in particular ways which are different from each other, and also different from the sense in which a discipline may be called 'subjective'. If theology is called subjective, by this is meant that it is arbitrary; its opposite, 'objective,' would mean necessary. In this sense theology can be objective, even though the reality with which it deals is, in some other sense, subjective. Theology may presuppose an evaluation, but it is still objective, because it studies a field of experience whose categorical question has been shown to be a necessary one, and because the methods it uses to study that field are conditioned by, and not arbitrarily imposed on, the material studied.

The 'chain of necessities' thus leads us to the necessity of theology. In this important sense theology can be objective, even though its starting point is an experience of evaluation. Such an experience can only arise with regard to a definite concrete historical religion. 'Either we have a religion in a historically given form, or we do not have it at all. If we have it historically, this is because its central content has been for us an experience of value. The first task of theology, therefore, is to establish the nature of this experience. Christian theology deals with the Christian religion, the Christian faith; first and foremost it must establish, with regard to the general nature of religion, what is characteristic of Christianity. And from here the chain of necessities goes on to particular theological disciplines.'[13]

[13] *Filosofi och Motivforskning,* p. 171.

The only point at which the chain seems to be broken is the positive attitude to the specific Christian evaluation, but here all historical religions are regarded as separate religious entities, and 'Christianity cannot deny the right of other religions to construct their own theology. This, however, does not thereby rob it of its own scientific character. It would do this only if it were possible to do justice to a religion without any relation to its historical realization, and this is not possible'.[14] Metaphysical philosophies of religion have attempted in this way to free themselves from the subjective (evaluative) nature of religion, but have thus abandoned historical religions. The failure to recognize the necessity of the historical realization of religion in particular experiences has caused them to become unscientific and arbitrary. 'The only objective treatment of religion, apart from the psychology and the history of religion, is to be found in the critical, not the metaphysical, philosophy of religion and in theology. In the context of these two disciplines we find the necessity that excludes all that is arbitrary. It is this that constitutes the objectivity and the scientific nature of theology.'[15]

V

We have seen how Nygren's philosophical 'analysis of presuppositions' leads to the idea of category, the categorical question to which the *a priori* is an answer. We come to the ultimate presuppositions, the philosophical principles. 'The validity of a principle can be expressed thus: if we are to maintain the validity of the particular, concrete experiential proposition, which no one challenges, then we must also recognize the validity of the presuppositions that are involved in it.'[16] There are various categorical questions: 'Experience is not, that is to say, exhausted by the theoretic demonstration of given physical relations. There are other propositions and judgments, that appear to be of this sort but which clearly lose their meanings if they are brought under epistemological presuppositions or categories. . . . An ethical judgment is subject to other presuppositions and defined by other categories than those of the theoretical judgment. And the same is the case with the religious judgment. Thus we have to deal with various great contexts of meaning, each governed by its own particular categories.'[17]

Taken from its proper context of meaning, a proposition either acquires a new meaning or becomes meaningless, and a religious proposition must be treated as part of the religious context, and not equated

[14] *Ibid.* pp. 185f.

[15] *Ibid.* p. 186.

[16] *Ibid.* p. 35. This section is based on the chapter *'Motivforskning som filosofiskt och teologiskt problem'*.

[17] *Ibid.* pp. 39f.

with the judgments of natural science. The categories can be viewed as fundamental questions to which particular judgments give their special answers. Thus a particular ethical judgment can be understood to give a particular answer to the fundamental question of 'the good'.

In the case of theoretical judgments of truth and falsehood the category defines the context of meaning, but in the case of ethics or religion we find an intermediate stage between the category and the particular judgment, and it is this that gives the judgment its peculiar meaning. A particular ethical judgment gives an answer to the categorical question of 'the good', but for this answer to be unambiguous, we must relate it to the particular ethical ideal of which it is an expression. 'X is good' will have different meanings as it is related to the Communist or the Christian ideal.

We find, similarly, in the historical religions, a relatively small number of answers to the fundamental religious question, and these answers set their mark on all the particular religious propositions in the context related to them. These are the intermediate stage between the category and the individual judgment, and it is this that we can call the 'fundamental religious motif, through which the particular religious judgment first becomes unambiguous'.[18]

In the religious context, therefore, there are subsidiary contexts of meaning. There is the category, and there are certain basic answers to the categorical question, which define the particular judgment. The categorical question that is answered makes the particular judgment religious, and not, for example, ethical, but it is the fundamental motif that makes the judgment unambiguous. There is an adoption of a particular position, but not of just any position; 'it is the adoption of a position demanded by certain unavoidable categorical questions'.[19]

'Thus we have the meaning of the concept "Fundamental Motif". By the fundamental motif of a particular view, we mean the fundamental answer it gives to a categorical question, and by which all the judgments, evaluations and attitudes of this view are brought together into a unified context of meaning. An examination which attempts to reach back to the fundamental motif governing a particular view, we call "motif research".'[20]

Motif research, therefore, perhaps the best known element in Lundensian theology, and particularly in the theology of Nygren,[21] is originally derived from the doctrine of categories to which this particular form of conceptual analysis leads. It is not an arbitrary method imposed on

[18] *Ibid.* p. 44.
[19] Ditto.
[20] Ditto.
[21] *Agape and Eros.* p. 35.

theology, but something that arises from this philosophical and theological method.

Nygren goes on to say 'It is immediately clear that such motif research is conditioned in two ways: the question is asked *philosophically;* the answer must be found in the given *historical* reality. Motif research is therefore on the border between philosophy and history; this implies that it is both a philosophical and an historical problem. With regard to its starting point it is related to the philosophical analysis of presuppositions, and the doctrine of categories that arises therefrom. It is when we attempt to approach the concrete material with the categories reached by the philosophical analysis of presuppositions that the necessity of looking for the fundamental motif arises. Motif research brings particular questions to the historical material, and therefore only certain elements in the material can be selected and presented as fundamental motifs.'[22]

The historical material is not violated by being thus approached with particular questions. Whenever history is written a chaos of material must be ordered in some way. Even a chronicle demands some selection, and if selection is not to be arbitrary and produce mere caricature, it must be made with a view to the wider context in which the material belongs, and it is the essential elements that must be selected. When we are dealing with the history of ideas this is especially necessary, and we are nearer to the historical reality as we assimilate and select our material objectively. True description is produced by the selection of what is essential, but this is only possible in a wider context of systematic study, and this leads us to motif research.

Motif research gives an objective method of selection, and does not make the disastrous attempt to force the material into the straight-jacket of an arbitrary standpoint. It approaches the material with questions that must be asked, and is tested by its reaction to them, for the material will only react to the right questions. What does not react to the ethical category is ethically irrelevant, and must be examined in another category.

As an example of the necessity of looking for the fundamental motif governing particular propositions Nygren compares a saying of Thomas Aquinas with one of Luther.[23] Thomas says 'Human love is evoked by the goodness of its object, God's love infuses and creates goodness in things.' Luther says 'God's love does not find its object, but creates it. Man's love is created by its object.' Superficially these sayings are alike, and at least one theologian has been misled into saying that the chief difference is one of confessional emphasis. In fact Thomas' saying belongs to the tradition where God's love is equated with causality, and goodness

[22] *Filosofi och Motivforskning,* pp. 44f.

[23] *Ibid.* pp. 52ff. The quotation from Thomas is from Summa Theol. 1, qu. 2, art. 2.; that from Luther from the 28th Article of the Heidelberg Disputation.

is existence. God lets something of His reality stream into the creation. It is an expression of His self love. This tradition ultimately derives from the idea of *Eros* in Plato. Luther, on the other hand, is talking of *Agape*. Man's love is receptive, called forth by the goodness of its object. God's love is the love which gave His Son, the love that goes to save that which has no value, to make something of nothing. It is the love that is seen most clearly on the Cross. Clearly this is more than a mere difference of emphasis in two confessions. In spite of their external form the two sayings have nothing in common. In one we are speaking of *Eros,* in the other of *Agape*. This is one of many examples which might be given to show how a saying only becomes unambiguous when taken in the context of the fundamental motif that governs it.

VI

Motif research also provides an objective approach to the problem of the task of systematic theology. To this problem there are traditionally two answers. (Nygren is not concerned with the answer that every theologian should present his private idea of the faith in the hope of helping others in the same situation, since such works do not claim to be objective, and thus do not belong to the realm of scientific theology.) The two answers are, firstly, that systematic theology has to sort out from the given manifestations of the faith what can be regarded as tenable and valid, and present this as a valid religious system, as eternal religious ideas, free from the historical clothing in which they occur, and secondly, that the task of systematic theology is to present the view of a particular group, a particular church or confession. Both try to present a normative idea of the faith, to show what ought to be believed, but neither can give objective reasons for the particular limitation of the material examined.

The task of systematic theology is rather to examine the Christian faith as it actually is, and to show what makes it what it is in its own characteristic form, different from other forms of religion. 'If it is true of every science that its task is to understand and clarify its object, then the task of systematic theology can only be to understand and clarify the Christian faith in its own specific character.'[24]

The chief difficulty here is to get an unambiguous definition of the Christian faith. To say that the Christian faith is the object of systematic theology implies that we are concerned with a unified phenomenon, but this appears to be contradicted by the variety of forms in which Christianity appears. There is scope here for arbitrary selection, and any theologian may claim that what he represents is the real Christian faith.

[24] *Teologi och Motivforskning*, p. 76.

Here, however, motif research can provide an objective way of deciding what is the true Christian faith. We have seen that religion is concerned with the question of the eternal, and moreover that historically this fundamental question is realized in certain particular ways. Nygren now starts from the idea of religion as communion with God, since no other form of religion is important when it is a question of discovering the fundamental motif of Christianity. The possibility of an atheistic religion is not overlooked, but it is obviously not of importance when we are thinking of Christianity, for here the Eternal is the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.

Christianity, then, must be seen as communion with God, and its fundamental motif must be found in its structure as a form of communion with God. This will be the fundamental motif of Christianity. It is not any random Christian thought that we denominate the fundamental motif, but that which stamps the Christian communion with God as Christian. When we turn to Christianity as a historical phenomenon, the answer is clear. Christianity comes as a gospel, a message of divine love, condescending to us in Christ. 'Communion with God in Christianity is what it is because it is God Himself who establishes it in His love and grace. Nothing in man can be said to be the motive of our communion with Him. The Divine Love is, in this sense, unmotived. God loves because He Himself is love. He seeks fellowship with man not because man has some particular worth—this is ruled out by the fact that before God man is always a sinner—but because love creates fellowship. God is *agape*. Here is the starting point of the whole Christian life, and this is the reason why the ethos of Christianity can be summed up in one word—love, or in the two commandments of love to God and love to our neighbour. The fundamental motif of Christianity is the motif of *agape*. Without this the Christian communion with God loses its unifying principle, and characteristic individuality. We can trace the conflict of this motif with other fundamental motifs, other answers to the question of how communion with God is to be established. Particularly with the Nomos-motif of Judaism and the Hellenistic Eros-motif.

Before we can finally establish that *agape* is the fundamental motif of Christianity we have to verify it by the historical material. If anything else is asserted to be the fundamental motif of Christianity, it must be tested by the material, and if it can be shown both that it answers the fundamental question, and that it does not do violence to the material, then it may claim to be the fundamental motif of Christianity. One would have to show how the Nomos motif, for example, the motif of man's communion with God by fulfilling the requirements of the law, explains Christian history from the beginning, how it makes Christianity something new with relation to Judaism, how Jesus' own view of His task and mission, and Paul's doctrine of justification and his struggle

with the law are derived from it. There is, in the adaptability of the material, a way of testing objectively what is the fundamental motif. This can only give the relative certainty that is characteristic of all research into historical material.

VII

I have tried in this paper to present a systematic outline of Nygren's theological work. Much has, of course, been omitted and certain points have had to be crudely stated without qualifications. For this I, and not Bishop Nygren, must bear the responsibility, but I believe that the views expressed are his and not my own construction. Perhaps I may add a brief comment of my own.

It is noticeable that the question of truth in religion does not have an important place in Nygren's work. This is because, in his view, the transcendent does not present itself for our inspection. We are limited to the world of our present experience, and the revelation of God in that world. We must, on the other hand, avoid confusing the relative certainty of the scientific study of the faith with faith itself. Faith does imply absolute certainty, but it does not necessarily follow that scientific and philosophical-scientific reflection about the faith can claim the same certainty.

REVIEWS

CHURCH AND SCROLLS*

The charge has been made by the American journalist Edmund Wilson and suggested by others that Christian scholars have not properly faced the implications of the evidence of the Dead Sea Scrolls for Christianity. Such statements were perhaps to be expected from those who sought to profit from the popular excitement stirred up by such spectacular finds in desert caves on the shores of the Dead Sea. But responsible scholars have realised from the beginning, when once the authenticity of the discovery was established, that here was a collection of documents, of which the evidence for biblical studies would surely be of the highest value but its evaluation would entail decades of minute research and specialist discussion. That Christian scholars have not been slow in undertaking the task nor tardy in publishing their (interim) conclusions is evident from this collection of essays which was originally published in America under the editorship of Krister Stendahl of the Harvard Divinity School. The symposium comprises fourteen papers by a number of well-known Catholic, Protestant and Jewish scholars of various nationalities. To give some idea of the nature of the subjects dealt with it will be necessary to mention the titles of the constituent essays: The Scrolls and the New Testament (K. Stendahl); 'The significance of the Qumran Texts for Research into the Beginnings of Christianity' (O. Cullmann); 'John the Baptist in the New Light of Ancient Scrolls' (W. H. Brownlee); 'The Two Messiahs of Aaron and Israel', 'The Lord's Supper and the Communal Meal at Qumran', 'New Light on Temptation, Sin, and Flesh in the New Testament' (all by K. G. Kuhn); 'The Sermon on the Mount and the Qumran Texts' (K. Schubert); '"Peace among Men of God's Good Pleasure", Lt. 2, 14' (E. Vogt, S.J.); 'The Dead Sea Manual of Discipline and the Jerusalem Church of Acts' (S. E. Johnson); 'The Constitution of the Primitive Church in the Light of Jewish Documents' (Bo Reicke); 'Paul and the Dead Sea Scrolls: Flesh and Spirit' (W. D. Davies); 'The Qumran Scrolls and the Johannine Gospel and Epistles' (R. E. Brown, S.S.); 'The Qumran Scrolls, the Ebionite, and their Literature' (J. E. Fitzmyer, S.J.); 'Hillel the Elder in the Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls' (N. N. Glatzer). Since many of these papers were originally published in various journals, they were not designed to dovetail into a symposium; there is consequently a certain amount of overlapping, particularly in the contributions of Kuhn and Davies on the Pauline theme of the 'Spirit' and the 'Flesh'. It may also be noted here that the publishers have unfortunately grouped all the notes together at the end of the book, which is a very irritating feature when documentation is heavy and constant reference to it is necessary.

A symposium is always difficult to review, and it is especially so when there is no unified theme, as is the case here. It is, accordingly, perhaps best to say first in general estimate that this is a very valuable collection of essays concerning various aspects of the bearing of the Qumran evidence on Primitive Christianity. To give a brief commentary upon certain of the essays may next help to indicate something of the nature of the conclusions reached by their authors.

Professor Cullmann is much concerned with the possibility of there having been some connection between the attitude of the Essenes (whom he equates with the Qumran sectaries) towards the Temple and its cultus and that of the first Christians. He suggests that the Hellenists of *Acts* might have been related to the Essenes, and this relationship too might explain the hostile reference to the Temple in *John*. However, the problem appears to be more complicated than is suggested here,

**The Scrolls and the New Testament*, edited by K. Stendahl (S.C.M. Press, London, 1958. pp. x + 208. 35s.).

because not only were the Jerusalem Christians zealously devoted to the Temple, according to *Acts,* but Josephus' account of the Essenes and the Qumran evidence are not clear about these sectaries' attitude to the Temple—and the bearing of the evidence of the Qumran copper scrolls has yet to be determined on this issue. Professor Brownlee concludes that the Scrolls vindicate the view set forth many years ago by Graetz that 'it was John the Essene who proclaimed the coming Messianic Age in the wilderness'. Indeed the Qumran evidence is of the highest value for our understanding of the Baptist and his movement, and it in turn enables us to see the Johannine narrative in a new light. Professor Kuhn's discussion of the significance of the communal meal of the Qumran community is too involved to permit of an adequate summary here; it must suffice to say that he shows that all future study of the origins of the Eucharist must take account of this Qumran institution, especially in terms of the issues which he particularises here. In his third essay Dr. Kuhn describes the importance of the Qumran dualism of the 'Prince of Light' and the 'Angel of darkness' for our understanding of the Gospel conception of the spiritual situation of man—'We see now how the pattern of the two powers, which is highly developed in the New Testament, belongs to the Jewish Palestinian tradition found at Qumran. That means that it does not come from Hellenism or from Gnosticism, a fact with great bearing on Pauline studies, and especially on our understanding of Rom. 6 and 7, where the concept of two powers determines the entire logic' (p. 104).

Bo Reicke notes the interesting parallel which exists between the New Testament grouping of the twelve apostles, with an inner triumvirate of Peter, James and John, and the Qumran council of twelve laymen and three priests. He concludes that the Qumran documents reveal a complex constitutional structure which included monarchic, oligarchic and democratic tendencies as did the Christian *Urgemeinde*. Dr. Davies concludes that, in his doctrine concerning the 'Flesh' and the 'Spirit', Paul stood closer to the main tradition of Old Testament and Rabbinic thought than to that of Qumran. The evidence of the Scrolls, in his opinion, is chiefly valuable in this connection because they supply additional clues to the connotation of the Pauline terminology. The essay of Fr. Fitzmeyer contains a most useful survey of the extant evidence concerning the Ebionites; he concludes from a comparison of this evidence with that from Qumran that the Ebionites are not to be identified with the Dead Sea community as Dr. J. L. Teicher has suggested. One notable defect in Fr. Fitzmeyer's account of the Ebionites, according to the mind of the present reviewer, is his uncritical acceptance of the accounts of Eusebius and Epihanius concerning the migration of the Jerusalem *Urgemeinde* to Pella in Transjordan prior to the destruction of the Jewish capital in A.D. 70.

After reading through this volume certain general impressions are left of the interests and orientation of at least this group of New Testament scholars. The first is that a tendency seems to be developing to exploit this new Qumran material to rebut the evidence that exists for believing that Hellenistic and Gnostic influences played an important part in forming what became the basic doctrines of Christianity. Such a tendency will need careful management, because a new assessment of non-Christian Gnosticism is in process of formulation and it must also be constantly borne in mind that Qumran theology shows much evidence of the influence of Iranian dualism, which is another field in which much research is at present proceeding. Another impression which emerges from these essays is that the old apologetic tendency is again at work to show that the Johannine Gospel is an early writing and of Palestinian origin. Let it be remembered here also that the Qumran documents attest the currency of non-Hebrew religious concepts in Palestine itself.

Finally, in the opinion of the present reviewer there is one very serious defect in

this series of studies. No account whatever is taken of the attitude of the Qumran community to the supreme issue which agitated Jewish society in the first century A.D., namely, Israel's deliverance from the yoke of heathen Rome. This neglect is all the more remarkable, since frequent use is made of the Qumran writing *The War of the Sons of Light against the Sons of Darkness* without so much as a passing mention of its political significance. Again, while the attitude of the Qumran sectaries to the Pharisees and Sadducees is considered, nothing is said of the obviously vital question of their relations with the Zealots, the patriotic party which was pledged to the achievement of Israel's liberation. In view of this silence about such a fundamental issue, it is perhaps not surprising that none of the writers considers the question of the attitude of the Jerusalem Christians to their nation's cause against Rome and what this might have meant in terms of their Christology. And in consequence too the significance escapes them of the fact that after the Roman attack on their settlement in A.D. 68 the Qumran sectaries disappear from history as completely as did the Jerusalem Christians after the destruction of Jerusalem by the army of Titus two years later.

S. G. F. Brandon

CHRISTIANS IN CHINA*

The history of the valiant efforts to bring the Christian Gospel to the Chinese people is peculiarly instructive and would repay careful study. Four times, through twelve centuries of Chinese history, Christian missions from the West established themselves in China, and each time, after considerable success, the missionaries were at last forced to withdraw. Nestorians, Franciscans and Jesuits followed in succession. Each found practically no evidence of the work of its predecessor. Finally, with the modern missionary movement which began in the early decades of the nineteenth century, the most sustained and large-scale attempt was made to win China over to the Christian faith. Yet, once again in these post-war years, we have witnessed the expulsion of all missionaries. Undoubtedly many forces over which the Christian Church had little or no control influenced the trend of events, but, if we are not to see a like situation arising in India, Africa and other parts of the world, it would be well for us to consider most carefully how far missionary policies, methods, attitudes and actions have contributed to the present unhappy situation. The Church must be willing to welcome criticisms of missionary enterprise, especially when those criticisms arise as a result of a serious attempt at impartial, historical research.

Dr. Paul A. Varg, associate professor of history at the Ohio State University, writes of the American Protestant Missionary Movement in China as an important element in the contact of two very diverse cultures. The central interest is focussed on 'the difficulties involved in an attempt to export the American ideology, whether it be Christian, democracy or capitalism'. It might well be argued that the central interest of the missionaries themselves was certainly not to export American ideology but to preach Christ, the universal saviour. It is, perhaps, a fair criticism of Dr. Varg's book that just because, as he admits in his preface, 'he is an outsider to the enterprise', he cannot fully appreciate the profound influence which the lives and witness of wholly-dedicated missionaries of every persuasion have had upon the Chinese people, as they have lived amongst them and served them with Christ-like devotion and love. It is more than probable that much of what is undoubtedly good in the China of to-day, and the measure of religious toleration which exists, is the

**Missionaries, Chinese and Diplomats: the American Protestant Missionary Movement in China, 1890-1952*, by Paul A. Varg. pp. xii + 335. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press; London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958. 48s.

direct result of the pioneer work of missionaries. The missionaries built far better than the present situation seems to indicate on the surface.

Nevertheless, a careful perusal of this book should convince the reader that many of the charges which are being made to-day by Chinese Christian leaders against their former colleagues are not altogether without foundation. Throughout the book there is ample evidence that missionaries were emissaries of American ideology, often hand-in-glove with their own diplomats. They ran their churches and schools as typical American institutions so that they were thought of as 'foreign'. Their compounds were often little American enclaves, divorced from the real life and needs of the people. Many of their converts became strangers to the currents of their own political life. After one hundred years of Christianity in China the Chinese had no church of their own. Basically it was a Mission Field, and the Church was divided and dismembered. It has needed 'liberation' and the removal of the missionaries, for the Chinese Christians to awaken to the need for union with their fellow believers, and, in the words of a Chinese Christian leader, for them 'to be thrust back upon the living Word of God, which is at once eternal, and yet timely to our situation'.

The author, alternating throughout the book between the home base and the mission field, keeps the reader continually aware of the reciprocal relations between the American church scene and the mission compound. He shows that, after the Boxer Rebellion, the main trend of American Protestant Missionary enterprise underwent a rapid change. Before that time the missionaries were conservative in theology, and concerned almost exclusively with the salvation of individuals. Protected by treaties, the protection clauses of which they had in large measure initiated, the missionaries carried on their work amidst frustrations, set-backs, dangers, and an almost impregnable wall of suspicion, hatred, mistrust and fear. They were sustained by the conviction of the rightness of their cause and of its ultimate triumph. With the twentieth century a more liberal theology and a growing humanitarianism in America resulted in a new missionary emphasis, and the 'social Gospel'. Great educational and medical institutions grew up. Sociological problems could no longer be ignored. Progressive missionaries sought to identify themselves with the democratic awakening.

The vigorous Chinese nationalism brought its problems and pressures, and Professor Varg shows how painful sometimes were the adjustments and the heart-searchings of missionaries torn between their duty as American citizens and their loyalty to the Chinese Church. The problems were particularly acute during the critical periods of civil war and the Sino-Japanese struggle.

The fact that the author is 'an outsider to the enterprise' leads him to make some strange blunders, as, for instance, on page 206 where he says that the Methodists joined the Church of Christ in China, or, on page 56, where he makes four mistakes in one short phrase, writing 'men like *Marquis Dodds* and George *Adams* Smith of the University of *Edinburgh*, were also enthusiastic evangelicals who, like *they*, believed that men should be led to a crisis when they made a decision for Christ'. The book, however, is well indexed, and sources are indicated in numerous footnotes.

To a sociologist and a historian, perhaps, religion may be thought of as 'only one phase of a culture'. To a missionary it is far more than that. But the lesson which the author points that 'we cannot Christianize the world *after our own image*' is one we need to accept, and the complexities of missionary work, as they are set forth in this book, should convince us of the need for humility and wisdom if Christianity through its representatives is to meet the needs and the challenge of the non-Christian world.

D. Howard Smith

SCIENCE AND/OR RELIGION*

This is a collection of lectures given by some Cambridge scientists in the University Church, Cambridge, in the Lent Term, 1957. The scientists were free to say exactly what they wished, and it was made clear to them that no theologians would be called upon to answer the scientists' case.

The impression left on my mind is that these lectures express, on the whole, that tendency to separate science from theology which is characteristic of our day. Science is one thing; theology another. Scientific proof is one thing; religious conviction another. This although in some respects true and a real gain for religion, is not without its dangers. It can easily degenerate into a dualism in one's thinking in which an insistence on proof, or at any rate adequate evidence, in the realm of science is accompanied by credulity and wishful thinking in the realm of religion. A good scientist can be a fundamentalist where the Bible is concerned or where, for that matter, communism is concerned.

The two lectures which gave me most pleasure, in the sense that they avoided this dualism, were those of Professor Hoyle, an astronomer and physicist, and Dr. Pantin, a zoologist. Professor Hoyle stands out from the other lecturers in taking an attitude more in sympathy with that of the founders of the Modern Churchmen's Union. He is not prepared to leave religion in a water-tight compartment, and he is frankly critical of what he calls 'formal religion'—an insistence, for example, on the miracles of Jesus and the Virgin Birth. But on the other hand he is by no means critical of 'religion in a non-formal sense', by which he means that 'a man will look up at the stars at night with a sense of awe, that he will feel that the majestic play of the Universe has some deep laid purpose, and that his own small role in the play must make sense, if only he has the wit to find it'.

Now many scientists, some analytical philosophers and even some dogmatic theologians have tended latterly to a parrotlike repetition of the statement that the Argument from Design is dead, and that science and philosophical theology cannot claim to prove purpose in the Universe. I have never been prepared to concede this, and was therefore delighted to find an outstanding scientist expressing sympathy with the conviction that there is 'deep laid purpose' in the Universe and that one's life must 'make sense'. Professor Hoyle's statement is all the more welcome in that he is a physicist and not a biologist. One tends to expect that if *any* scientist is to speak of purpose in nature it will be a biologist. But Professor Hoyle goes on to amplify his remark by a consideration of the production of the ninety or so kinds of atoms in the interior of stars. He concludes 'If this were a purely scientific question and not one that touched on the religious problem, I do not believe that any scientist who examined the evidence would fail to draw the inference that the laws of nuclear physics have been deliberately designed with regard to the consequences they produce inside the stars'.

Dr. Pantin, writing as a biologist, deals faithfully with the notion that belief in natural selection renders unnecessary the postulation of purpose in the Universe. 'The fact that an eye on the principle of the photographic camera is one of the few possible solutions which meet the need of an organ of vision is not a consequence of selection but of the underlying plan of nature; and in the same way it is here that we must place our human qualities.' . . . 'When we examine the natural world, there is clear evidence in it of a plan.' He quite rightly insists that the scientific picture of the world is a morally neutral one, but he equally rightly insists that this neutrality is not in nature itself but in the limitations of our scientific method and of the picture of nature which it gives.

F. H. CLEOBURY

**Religion and the Scientists.* Edited with a preface by Mervyn Stockwood (S.C.M., 1959. 5s.).

MYTH AND REALITY IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

In the latest addition to that useful series *Studies in Biblical Theology,* an American scholar, Dr. Brevard S. Childs, has attempted a reappraisal of the much discussed subject of myth in the Old Testament. In spite of an occasional tendency to slip into theological jargon, and a somewhat laboured style, the author has undoubtedly made a real contribution to the subject. He rightly rejects the attempt of some modern scholars to eliminate any traces of Babylonian mythology from the Hebrew account of Creation in the first chapter of Genesis, and recognizes that the idea of a creation *ex nihilo* is, to use his own words, 'never explicitly expressed in the Old Testament'. He insists that both internal and external evidence 'indicate that the description of chaos in 1.2 belongs to an original body of foreign mythical material which has entered into the tradition of Israel'. He admits, as against Heidel and others, the connection between the Hebrew *tehom* and the Akkadian *tiamat,* the name of the chaos dragon in the Babylonian Enuma elish; but points out that, while the word retains its feminine undetermined form, it has only vestigial significance. 'The independent life once in the word has been "demythologized" to such an extent that without the parallels from comparative religion, its mythical origin would have passed unnoticed'. Indeed, it might be said with justice that Dr. Childs has applied Bultmann's concept of demythologization to the attitude of the Priestly editors and the post-exilic prophets towards the mythical elements which they found in the ancient traditions of Israel.

The author has recognized that Gunkel had begun to demonstrate the process of demythologization in Israel's religious development, but points out that Gunkel had ascribed this merely to a monotheistic aversion to myth. In contrast with this approach Dr. Childs applies a new criterion to measure the different degrees of control with which Israel assimilated the mythical material. This criterion he finds in Israel's basic understanding of reality. 'Our study', he says, 'has attempted to throw light of the role of the myth in forming theological categories to express the uniquely Biblical concepts of time and space by which Israel gave articulation to her understanding of the new reality'.

The most original feature of Dr. Brevard's thesis is his analysis of what he calls 'mythical time' and 'mythical space'. In the stage of mythical thinking he finds a 'two stage' understanding of world reality. There was initially a period of non-being. This was superseded by the decisive acts of the primeval age through which the world structure was fixed. The purpose of myth was to ensure the continuance of the world's being against all attempts to return to the state of non-being. It may be remarked here that this aspect of the function of myth was put forward in the account of the relation between myth and ritual given in *Myth and Ritual* published nearly thirty years ago. As against this two-stage view of time Dr. Brevard describes the Biblical understanding of the reality of time as a three-stage conception. First there was a state of non-being pictured as chaos in the Old Testament. This was overcome by the divine activity of creation which brought world-order into being. The third stage was initiated by man's disobedience. A history of sin began which was not a continuation of God's creation but a perversion of reality. We seem to have here a restatement in other terms of the German view of the Old Testament as *heilsgeschichte,* an approach which has been of great value. Dr. Brevard pursues a similar line with regard to space, in the course of which he has an interesting exposition of the significance of the 'navel' of the earth as the centre of communication with both the heavenly and the nether worlds.

Dr. Brevard's treatment of this important theme will repay careful study and opens out many fruitful lines of thought Some readers would probably welcome a

definition of the term 'phenomenological' as applied to myth. There is also a curious misprint on p. 29 where we are told that 'the fertility of the *law* depended upon the annual increase of the Nile'.

S. H. Hooke

QUAKERISM RE-THOUGHT*

Mr. Ullmann has written a book of great importance, and the Sir Halley Stewart Trustees were absolutely right in making its publication possible. The autnor is on the staff of Woodbrooke, the well-known college of the Society of Friends at Selly Oak, Birmingham, and his prime purpose is to re-think and re-state the Quaker position in the course of a study of the predicament of Western man. This latter aim is the less important of the two. It has been done many times before, but not usually by Quakers who have seemed curiously aloof from most contemporary philosophical and theological thought. Here we find a Quaker quoting the familiar existentialist philosophers and neo-orthodox theologians, to interpret for his own community the need for radical involvement in the changing day-to-day decisions of this century, taking history seriously in all its complexity and relativity, and not taking refuge in an unhistorical mysticism buttressed by timeless principles. It is, however, his reappraisal of Quakerism which is of greater significance, for in it he gives a searching criticism of what to many have seemed the weaknesses of Quaker theology, and at the same time a better analysis of what is involved in Christian ethical decisions than I have ever found elsewhere.

The first part is largely taken up with a critique of the Quaker attitude to history, with what von Hugel called its 'historical ingratitude' This has its foundation in the unsatisfactory theology of George Fox. For him the second coming of Christ had arrived (though it was still in the near future for those not yet convinced). He regarded everything since the early Church as a time of defection from the Gospel, and thus failed to recognise any of the influences which had moulded him, even that of the Scriptures; indeed since the Fall had now been restored, even the Incarnation itself had little significance; and those who listened to God's guidance could regard themselves as infallible. With the abandonment of these eschatological ideas Friends have tended to replace them by Utopian ones; the sense of living in the Kingdom of God is replaced by that of working for or building it, in an entirely un-scriptural and Utopian sense; there has come to be a one-sided stres on human goodness as such; and the Quaker mystical tendencies have underplayed the changing relativities of history so that while there have been a number of eminent Quaker scientists there have been hardly any Quaker historians.

The second part of the book is called 'Doing the Will of God'. In criticising common Quaker attitudes Ullmann says many important things about Christian ethics. 'I do not believe that God's will for us, though becoming clear in concrete situations, prompts as much the action which we are to undertake as the attitude which helps us to find what under God we ourselves consider the best possible action' (p. 106). Good motives and intentions are not enough; they cannot be divorced from a consideration of the effects and consequences of actions, and about these there can be no certainty. The Christian does his best to evaluate them and then acts in faith. Indeed one of the graces of his faith is to save him from desolation in failures, errors and sins. Consistency does not lie in actions, which take place in the varied contingencies of history, but in the spirit which leads us to be our true selves within the 'structure of being' (a phrase drawn from Tillich). God's will differs for different people in different situations and for the same person in different situations,

* *George Fox and the Quakers*, by Henry van Etten (Longmans (Men of Wisdom books) 6s.).

not least because of the inescapable social structures (like the State) in which we are placed. Too many are tempted to regard these structures merely as free associations. The dichotomy between an ethic of principles and an ethic of consequences is a false one; both are necessary. A careful calculation of potential results, based upon experience in past and present, cannot be avoided, even though they are not completely predictable. Those who think this is a very uncertain procedure are reminded that, if they stress an ethic of motive, our motives are never so clear and transparent as we assume.

It will be seen that this is a powerful polemic against fixed principles, whether Quaker or other. The absolutist never realises how much he is involved and conditioned, nor does he face the evils caused by ill-informed but emotionally prompted good intentions. In giving a searching criticism of Quaker theology Ullmann has put us all in his debt. There are points of detail which we could criticise, but they are of little moment. There is, however, one major point which is far from clear to me. One would expect from Ullmann's exposition the admission that a pacifist position might be right in some circumstances for some people, but not necessarily all, and on p. 165 it is stated that discussion of this issue is only possible on the basis of deciding which is the lesser of two evils. Yet on p. 128 we are told that there are no actions which are as such Christian but there are actions which are never Christian, warfare being one. The weight of the historical pacifist testimony of the Quakers appears here to have caused an inconsistency at an important point in the working out of the author's thesis. There is much more in the book which I cannot deal with here. It is the most fruitful discussion of the foundation of Christian Ethics that I have come across for some years, and I am grateful for having had it brought to my notice. It is of immense importance to Friends, and valuable to us all.

Henry van Etten's book on George Fox is in the usual style of the 'men of wisdom' series, a very concentrated text, many illustrations, and a good bibliography. Dr. van Etten is a French Friend and his book was originally written in French. The text is too condensed, but it does provide a convenient account of the history of the Friends, though it is less satisfactory on their origins. The anthology of quotations which characterises this series reveals the theological and liturgical weakness of some of the classical Quakers. The printer has made hay of the text on pages 162 and 3.

RONALD PRESTON

GOD IN CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE*

Those acquainted with Professor Lewis's earlier writings will expect from this book a profound and often original treatment of fundamental matters. They will not be disappointed. We are told at the outset that the book is mainly concerned with the question 'How do we know that our religious assertions are true?' The method is, broadly, to analyse religious experiences with a view to a deeper understanding of their nature. He discusses the various patterns of religious experience, the part played by images, the relation of experience to theology and dogma, to 'material factors' such as ritual acts, and to symbolism and art. There is a valuable chapter on petitionary prayer.

In the chapter 'Belief and Mystery' Professor Lewis makes some timely criticisms of the idea that mystical experience involves a literal union with God or absorption into His being. 'The merit of the Hebrew and Christian doctrine of creation is that it preserves our dependence on a mysterious source which is complete and ultimate

*_Our Experience of God_. H. D. Lewis (Allen & Unwin, 1959. 30s. net.).

in itself while allowing us our distinct creaturely existence.' He does not question the intimacy of the sense of the presence of God which some persons have enjoyed, but he insists, very rightly in my view, that finite experience of God has essentially a *mediated* character. Language about mystical union must not be taken too readily at its face value. 'In the main, the mystics who impress us most have been the keenest to make this point themselves.'

I have one point of disagreement with Professor Lewis. In the chapter on *Religion and Morality* he tells us that 'there is no immediate argument from the objectivity of ethics to the existence of God or to other truths about Him.'. If by 'immediate argument' he means logically necessary or tautological argument—an argument in the manner of Euclid—he is, of course, right. But if he means that in defending our belief in God, and our belief in His goodness in spite of the evil in the world, we can make no cogent appeal to our moral experience, then I must disagree. The point surely is that if we believe that values are objective, then our metaphysical beliefs must correspond—we must hold that reality is of such a nature as to 'house' objective values. Impersonal entities, particles or sensa, cannot do this. He points out that atheists and secular humanists can be genuinely moral. We need not doubt this, but we can charge them with failing to draw out the implications of their ethical beliefs. (We might even go farther, and suspect that such failure may be unconsciously *motivated*.)

Nor does Professor Lewis's criticism, in this connection, of a statement by Professor Leonard Hodgson meet the case. In his *Faith and Freedom* the latter wrote 'If this space-time universe, this developing process, be the whole of reality . . . I do not see how our judgments of value could ever be more than the expression of our own subjective tastes. . . . In theory the last word would be with the existentialist; in practice, with the dictator'. Professor Lewis comments that if Professor Hodgson were to cease to be a Christian he would still hold the practices of dictators in moral abhorrence. But what does this prove? Merely that moral habits acquired in youth tend to remain unchanged even if one's metaphysical beliefs change. It does not prove that in the process of *establishing* the moral habits of the race and of the individual, beliefs as to the nature and source of the universe are irrelevant. Nor does it prove that loss of faith would not *in the long run*, i.e., for future generations, lead to a decline in morals. Nor is a belief in God based on moral experience a belief in a remote or deistic God, as Professor Lewis suggests. To believe that the voice of conscience is the voice of God in the soul is, surely, to believe in an *immanent* God.

But this one criticism does not affect my general judgment that this book is an important and valuable study of the nature of the Christian experience of God.

F. H. Cleobury

FREE TO LIVE*

This is a book which could not—or at any rate would not—have been written a generation ago. It is an able and interesting example of the way modern philosophical analysts (and I write 'modern' to emphasise a period in which even logical positivism is regarded as outmoded) write about those problems which have always been regarded as the subject-matter of philosophy. It would not be true to say that the analytical writers on the whole are not interested in the objective situation but only in language. Professor Ramsey *is* interested in the objective situation, but he is influenced by the modern tendency both to beware of the misleading suggestions of

**Freedom and Immortality*, by Ian Ramsey (S.C.M. Press, 1960. 16s.).

unanalysed language and also to unveil, by analysis, the wealth of subtle distinctions in the objective situation which ordinary language contains.

In dealing with the problem of freedom he first analyses language about a 'free decision', and he shows that when we claim to make such a decision we are responding to a situation which cannot be exhaustively described by language about observables—things or occurrences in space and time. 'At such moments of decision, when all of us characteristically use of ourselves the word "I", this word covers more than all language about objects or all scientific language talks about.' He then goes on to consider the notion of duty or obligation, and its relation to that of freedom. He argues that along with a decision that is personal and free there goes a challenging moral obligation to which that decision is a response, and that while this challenge may be labelled 'Absolute Value' or 'Duty' it can also carry the more comprehensive description 'God's will'. The *All*-Power of God carries with it the notion of *moral* power, and of the power of love, and in the nature of things such All-Power, far from contradicting human freedom, demands it.

In treating of immortality Professor Ramsey contends that the 'disclosure situations' which reveal us to ourselves as transcending the spatio-temporal world, and as free and responsible, also reveal us to ourselves as immortal. He is concerned on the one hand to maintain the validity of metaphysical concepts like freedom and immortality as against those who disparage metaphysics, and yet, on the other hand, to insist that such metaphysical language must be grounded in our here-and-now experience. He argues that a conviction of immortality is born in us in situations in which we naturally talk of an End which is not regarded as the last event in a time series, and in situations in which we talk of a 'future' life in terms of purpose, moral retribution or *agape*.

Professor Ramsey regards immortality as essentially a concept of spatio-temporal transcendence, and references to the 'future' have, therefore, to be interpreted as conveying not simple futurity but something more. In my view talk of the 'eternal' as 'transcending' time and space needs far more analysis than anyone I know of has given it. Whatever more Jones's 'future life' may be, it must surely, unless we deny the Christian hope altogether, be a selfconsciousness which remembers Jones's earthly life 'from the inside' and carries on with the good purposes which characterised his earthly probation. In this connexion I am surprised that Professor Ramsey takes McTaggart's treatment of immortality seriously; it seems to me an outstanding example of spurious metaphysics. An 'immortality' based on the *a priori* notion that I possess an indestructible spirit-substance which *must* have had an un-remembered existence in the past is thoroughly suspect, as is the argument that we can't postulate a future existence unless we postulate pre-existence.

Professor Ramsey has given us an acute and penetrating study in the analysis of language about freedom and immortality. But for many of us it will strengthen our conviction that language analysis is only a *preliminary* to genuine philosophical study. G. R. Warnock is, I think, right in his contention (*English Philosophy since* 1900) that not all philosophical problems arise from linguistic sources; there are genuine ontological ones. I do not think the light we seek on the question of survival of death is to be got from language analysis alone. Indeed, it is not a purely philosophical question; the expectation of survival of death is not, in principle, incapable of experimental verification. One does not have to be a spiritualist before one can expect to *verify* one's eventual survival of physical death.

F. H. Cleobury

A GEORGIAN ODDITY*

The name of Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, 1742-1799, Professor of Mathematics and Physics at the University of Goettingen, is probably not very well known to the general reader of our time in England. But this 'small hunchback with sharp features' (and still sharper mind) was a great admirer of England, as he knew it in the reign of George III. He was not an uncritical admirer:

'When the fog comes down, O Heavens, what a place Kew is. . . . The Englishman pulls his coat collar up over his nose and strides on, his head full of eccentric notions. A few turn to prophesy. Some become religious and others shoot themselves'. Later, not a few young Englishmen were entrusted to Lichtenberg's care, and among his pupils were two of the King's younger sons. He once complained that the best ten years of his life had been spent in 'taming young Englishmen', but the trouble they caused him never spoilt his grateful memories of England.

This remarkable man, who described himself on different occasions as 'a reasonable rebel' and 'a pathological egoist', was among the first to investigate the nature of electricity scientifically, to dream of the conquest of the air, not by balloon but by a machine heavier than air, driven by propellers, and to investigate the meaning of dreams, a century before Freud. 'He was the first to experiment with his dreams, the first to point the way forward from the "interpretation", till then customary, to analysis.'

Much of the most entertaining part of this short biography is derived from his 'waste-book', a thick notebook in which he noted daily his 'mental income in pennyworths', recording with minute care his opinions, moods and resolutions. His biographer describes him as 'a praying freethinker', who wrestled with God and 'like the wise man of antiquity faced with the question, "What is God?" he asked for a few days to think it over, and then a few more days and was never finished'. . . . But the more tolerantly he viewed all religious questions, the more embittered he became over the intolerance and dogmatic torpor of the orthodox'. . . .

Those who imagine that only England can produce the brilliant eccentric may have second thoughts after reading this book.

R. C. Tait

**A Reasonable Rebel*, by Carl Brinitzer, translated from the German by Bernard Smith (George Allen & Unwin. 203 pp., one illustration. 21s.).

JEWS AND GREEKS*

M. Simon in these Haskell lectures analyses and discusses what has always been regarded as one of the most obscure sections of Acts, the account of Stephen's martyrdom and particularly the speech accorded to him in his defence. The Hellenists M. Simon reckons to be 'individuals or groups who allegedly under the influence and contamination of Greek thought strayed from the ways of strict orthodoxy and could therefore be labelled as 'paganising'. (p. 13). Sitting loosely to the temple-cult, and able to see Jewish ethical monotheism as in a large degree harmonious with current philosophy, they made Samaria one of their mission fields. M. Simon regards Stephen's speech as that of a reformer within Judaism rather than that of a complete religious revolutionary comparable to Jesus. He is linked with Jesus by their common condemnation of the temple-cult, which Stephen regards as an erroneous form of worship originating in the idolatry of the golden calf in the wilderness. In the judgment of M. Simon Stephen or the Hellenists did not leave behind them any form of Christianity peculiar to themselves, but at Antioch at any rate preached a

**St. Stephen and the Hellenists*, by Marcel Simon (Longmans Green. 15s.).

gospel which raised the fundamental problem of Christianity versus Judaism and the Law. Paul solved it by a new interpretation of Judaism, which enabled the church to be both universalistic and the inheritor of Judaism. M. Simon notes the resemblances between the Hellenists and the Ebionites: it is somewhat surprising that he omits any comparison between the Hellenist version of Christianity and Petrine version. His lucid, temperate and thorough presentation of the problems raised by Stephen's speech and the activities of the Hellenists cannot be ignored by any student of Christian origins.

H. C. Snape

THE APOCALYPSE OF JOHN*

In 1941 Professor Torrey published a volume of studies in the New Testament entitled *Documents of the Primitive Church,* which, owing to wartime conditions, did not receive in Great Britain the circulation and attention which it deserved. The fifth chapter of this volume, running to about 100 pages, dealt with 'The Language and Date of the Apocalypse'. The argument of this chapter was that Revelation (which Torrey dated in Galba's principate, June, A.D. 68—Jan., A.D. 69) was originally written in Aramaic, and that the curious Greek in which it has come down to us is due to its being a very literal translation from the original Aramaic. The excessive literalness of the translation was the result of the translator's respect for the warning of Rev. xxii, 18 f. R. H. Charles's view that the seer thought in Hebrew and wrote in Greek was rejected as inadequate to account for the linguistic phenomena. Charles's rearrangement of the text was also rejected. Particularly valuable were Torrey's remarks on the metrical passages of Revelation; he referred to the metrics of the book as 'a fascinating subject which must be left to future investigators'.

Torrey continued to think about the origin and purpose of Revelation, and the fruit of his further thinking is now before us in the present book, which was in the hands of the printer before the author's death in November 1956, at the age of 92, and was seen through the press by his daughter, Mrs. Nancy Torrey Fruch.

Torrey maintains that the odd grammar of the Apocalypse is not due to the writer's defective command of the Greek language—his command of it, from some points of view, is remarkably comprehensive—but to the fact that he was deliberately giving a literal rendering of a Semitic original, a Semitic origin which was Aramaic rather than Hebrew. He compares the very odd English which marks F. C. Burkitt's rendering of the Old Syriac Gospels in his *Evangelion da-Mepharreshe*—a rendering which does not imply Burkitt's defective command of English, but his endeavour to reproduce the Syriac idiom as faithfully as possible in English. While the Aramaisms which Torrey, in his other writings, detects in the Gospels are sufficiently explicable in terms or oral or written Aramaic sources on which the Evangelists drew, rather than by his hypothesis that the four Gospels were originally written as such in Aramaic, it does seem to the reviewer that Torrey's thesis in respect of the Apocalypse is stronger. The evidence is cumulative, but one of the most brilliant points he makes is that the title 'King of Kings and Lord of Lords' borne by the conquering hero of Rev. xix, 16 was surely inscribed not on 'his thigh' but on 'his banner'—Aram. *dagleh* having been misread as *ragleh* by the common confusion of *daleth* and *resh*.

To be sure, Torrey (*more suo*) overstates his case. We need not suppose that the seven churches of Asia were Aramaic-speaking when the Apocalypse was sent to them. Evidence for the use of Aramaic at Sardis under the Persian Empire is

*_The Apocalypse of John_, by Charles C. Torrey (Yale University Press. London: Oxford University Press, 1959. 40s. xvi, 210 pp.).

irrelevant in this connection, and the Hebrew-Aramaic list of Old Testament books first published by Bryennios is equally irrelevant, for all Torrey's interesting discussion of it; in fact he himself infers from it that Aramaic 'was unfamiliar to the readers of the list' (p. 33), and if the readers of the list included the churches of Asia, as he appears to believe, we need not be surprised that Aramaic was unfamiliar to them. Indeed, if Torrey's main thesis is right, it was surely the unfamiliarity of Aramaic in those churches that made a Greek translation necessary. The original author was no doubt a Palestinian Jew, whose mother-tongue was Aramaic.

The reviewer would agree with much that Torrey says about the date and purpose of the Apocalypse, except that he thinks the sixth emperor, who was on the throne when John saw his visions (Rev. xvii, 10), to have been Vespasion rather than Galba; but that involves a dating only a few months later than Torrey's. Whether the Apocalypse does in fact presuppose the existence of our canonical Gospel of Matthew, as Torrey thinks, is questionable. And it is more than questionable to say that 'our Apocalypse was composed at the time of greatest harmony between Jews and Christians' (p. 83), or to argue that a book claiming to be in the prophetic succession could not have been issued after the rabbinical anthematization of Nazarenes in A.D. 80 or thereabout. The Apocalypse claims to be prophecy, it is true, but *Christian* prophecy.

A translation of the Aramaic *Urtext*, as envisaged by Torrey, is provided; it would have been good if the reconstructed *Urtext* itself could have been included, but this would no doubt have made the cost of producing the book prohibitive. We may well be grateful for all that we have been given here.

F. F. Bruce

SAVONAROLA: TRUTHFUL PROPHET OR MEDDLESOME FRIAR?

By C. J. Wright

The editor of *The Catholic Herald* has, like most 'historians' in writing about others, revealed himself. The title of his book on Savonarola is *The Meddlesome Friar*.* None who is acquainted, however slightly, with the prophets of all religions, and of none, will be surprised at the adjective. For to the final dogmatist the sin of sins is to meddle with Dogma, System, Institution. It is always necessary to 'debunk' these meddlesome men who trouble their overlords. It is always expedient that one man should die lest sleepers awake from their dogmatic slumber. And never more necessary or expedient than to-day. For mental, moral and spiritual sleep is the last recipe in all authoritarian camps for the vast and pervasive unease instilled by an age of unexampled challenge.

Savonarola was undoubtedly—as much as Wyclif in England and Hus in Bohemia —a 'morning star' of reformation. Not, however, of 'The' Reformation fathered by Luther and Calvin. So that the nineteenth century memorial of that Reformation in Worms is both morally and spiritually true *and* dogmatically false: the memorial, that is, to Luther which had at the corners of the chief pedestal four 'precursors'— Hus, Savonarola, Wyclif and Waldo. Like all would-be reformers Savonarola did and said more than he knew.

His was not to reason against or with an inherited dogmatic system. It was enough for him to fight the immediate evil, to proclaim the immediate truth, and to accept, as the foreseen consequence, a martyr's death. When this Italian Dominican monk was led to the scaffold in Florence, the episcopal formula was read to him: 'I separate thee from the church militant and the church triumphant'. Savonarola answered

* *The Meddlesome Friar*. By Michael de la Bedoyere. Collins, 18/-. 1957.

firmly: 'Not from the church triumphant: that is beyond thy power'. Thus to his last earthly moment he refused to acquiesce in the basic falsehood speaking in superstitious person, dogma and institution.

But he was the leader of no party, the founder of no sect, the originator of no system. He was—as Villari made clear in his enduring study—a prophet of the Renaissance civilisation. Nor was Villari, as our present protagonist for the finality of dogma and its institutional embodiment declares, 'the hero-worshipper of Savonarola'. He was not that, as any fair-minded reader untied to unalterable dogma will see very clearly. No more was Villari the hero-worshipper of Savonarola than de la Bedoyere is the hero-worshipper of Pope Alexander VI. The real issue about the contest between a Pope whose moral character and spiritual integrity not even friendly historians dare, save covertly, to defend, and a passionate monk who would not consent to be silent about that Pope's enormities is deeper than this popular book declares or makes plain.

This book, in the modern biographical vein and style, is as much about a notorious Borgia as about the friar who dared to feel deeply and to speak and write openly about him and his evil works. How wise Savonarola ought to have been when dealing with a Pope who, let us remember, was not only an open fornicator but an efficient ecclesiastic! Why did not the preaching friar play the great game with less 'fanatical' zeal? How could a Pope overlook the egoistic passion of one who claimed to have private revelation or guidance so that he did not shrink from open revolt against Rome's 'divine' and 'supernatural' authority?

This claim to 'divine' and 'supernatural' authority! It was the crux then. It is the crux now. Is there any other test of all such proud claims than the test of Jesus and every prophet of every creed—'By their fruits ye shall know them'?

As I write this brief review I recall what Voltaire, the mocking prophet of the eighteenth century, wrote of Savonarola and Pope Alexander VI in his *Essay on the Manners and Spirit of Nations.*

> 'Methinks I see you look with an eye of commiseration on these scenes of absurdity and wickedness, of which you will find no examples among the Greeks and Romans, nor even among the barbarians. They were the effect of the most infamous superstition that ever debased the mind of man, and of the worst of all possible governments. But you well know, that it is not long since we ourselves emerged from this darkness, and that we are not yet completely enlightened.'

Savonarola is to-day esteemed more justly, I believe, than in any past age. He dared to rebel unto death against the blatant evils seated on a papal throne.

GOD AND MAN

This book[1] originated as the Croall Lectures delivered at New College, Edinburgh in 1951. Over the past eight years the author has been working further on his material. The result is an admirable book which, on a basis of good scholarship, develops very clearly and carefully a theme of great practical and theoretical importance.

The author's thesis is that what he calls the 'fragmentation of the Gospel' has been 'the bane of Christendom and has much to do with our unhappy divisions' (p. 9). In speaking of this 'fragmentation' he means 'the tendency from the beginning . . . to concentrate attention on one part or aspect of the fact of Christ, to lay a disproportionate emphasis on it, and, by implication, to pit it against the others' (p. 27). By contrast, Dr. Hendry's book is an attempt to recapture and to express what Leonard Hodgson has called 'the organic wholeness of the Christian faith' (quoted on page 30). In particular the author wishes to rescue the Incarnation, the total life of Christ,

[1] *The Gospel of the Incarnation,* by George S. Hendry (S.C.M., 1959. 15s. 174 pp.).

from the eclipse it has often suffered in Christian theology. He admits that little reference is made to the life of Christ in the *Kerygma*. But 'the preservation of the Synoptic records reflects a belief that the history of Jesus possesses a greater significance than it had been given in the primitive kerygma. The question is whether these additional emphases 'represent sidetracks from the main line' of the apostolic preaching, as Dodd suggests, or whether they represent attempts to supply elements that, though missing from the primitive kerygma, are integral to the very gospel it proclaimed' (p. 41). Dr. Hendry takes the latter view.

In chapters II and IV he considers the humanity of Christ as it was treated respectively by Eastern and Western theology. The Eastern Church preserved 'the consubstantiality of Christ with us as regards his manhood', 'an ontological relation with mankind into which Christ entered by his incarnation and which forms the presupposition or precondition of his atoning work' (p. 45). But this theme was lost to Western theology. Although the three representative figures from Western theology which Dr. Hendry considers—Anselm, Aquinas and Calvin—'all profess their acceptance of orthodox Christology . . . yet in none of them does the element we have especially in view appear in its original significance and function' (p. 63). For example 'when Anselm speaks of Christ's assumption of human nature, he means, not what the Eastern Church meant, but generic identity' (pp. 64-5).

This limitation continued to show itself, argues Dr. Hendry, in modern thought, where 'much of the ferment in Christology . . . took place in or around the vacuum resulting from the virtual disappearance of the notion of consubstantiality from the European mind' (Cp. p. 73). In this regard, whatever his other defects, Hegel at least compelled theologians to look at the 'universality' of Christ, and Schleiermacher, too, despite his other deficiencies, was not without his merits. Likewise the ethical approach to the Atonement, typical of English speaking theology, had undoubted advantages. But it also had its own difficulties (Cp. p. 80). For it tended to make theology too individualist, and once again consubstantiality in the full Eastern sense was missed.

Against this historical survey the author develops his own attempt to combat 'fragmentation', when he seeks to unite the Incarnation and the Atonement by the concept of forgiveness. Jesus Christ 'is the nucleus or centre through whom both the inexorable demands of the righteousness of God and the inexpressible grace of his forgiveness are disseminated through mankind' (p. 114). Against that comprehensive perspective he considers traditional doctrines of the Atonement, and reflects that 'there can be no theory of the Atonement that is other than the fact of the Atonement'; 'Christ did not make forgiveness possible; he bestows it on us' (pp. 146-7). The conclusion is that the only true theory of the Atonement consists in the rehearsal of the events in which it is accomplished. 'The truth of the gospel is the history of the incarnate Christ in the performance of his saving work' (p. 147).

In a final chapter, Dr. Hendry argues that while the Church is rightly understood as an extension of the Incarnation, it is not rightly understood as a sort of factual continuation of the historical Jesus. Rather is it an extension of the Incarnation only if, and in so far as it continues, in the present, the presence of the Holy Spirit; in so far as it is a society of the forgiven. In this way Dr. Hendry makes forgiveness in Christ a concept at once incarnationally and soteriologically central to the whole book.

We cannot but sympathise enormously with Dr. Hendry's concern to avoid fragmentation; but we can also go further and admire greatly the care with which he develops positively his own suggestions. The book contains some fine insights, and the reader puts the book down feeling that here has been a job well and carefully done. The book contains an unusually wide perspective of Christian theology, and

not its least merit is that it provokes the reader to work out for himself and in this broad setting, some of the important implications of this scholarly and fascinating book.

September, 1959 I. T. Ramsey

SHORT NOTICES

Facts and Obligations, by Dorothy Emmet (Dr. William's Trust, 1958. 3s. 6d.)

This lecture is concerned with the thesis that obligations cannot be inferred from facts, or that 'from a statement that something is the case no conclusion can be drawn about what ought to be done'. Professor Emmet offers a closely reasoned examination of a number of apparent exceptions to this rule, and concludes that in these cases what appears to be a statement of fact is not a *mere* statement of fact but carries with it, however well concealed, a value-judgment.

The interest of this to the modern churchman is that it supports the pure Kantian view of the categorical imperative. The statement that a certain course of action is right, or is our duty, is not a logical deduction from any theological premise. We can, of course, argue, as Kant did, *from* the categorical imperative to belief in God and immortality, but that is a different matter altogether. *At the outset* the imperative must stand on its own feet.

Nor does the doctrine which Professor Emmet is examining mean that there is no connexion between our views about the Universe and our practical reaction to those views. To affirm this would be absurd. There are metaphysical views which encourage virtue and others which induce moral despair. But a practical reaction is not the same as a logical deduction; there is no strictly deductive, or logically necessary, inference from fact to obligation.

This lecture is well worth studying as an instance of the meticulous care with which modern philosophers conduct their discussions, in contrast to the woolliness which characterised so much metaphysical writing up to a generation ago.

F. H. Cleobury

Mass Communication and the Spirit of Man, by C. O. Rhodes (Lindsey Press. 2s.)

This is the Essex Hall lecture for 1959, and to say that it is characteristic of the lecturer is to commend it. There are here that mastery of detail and the frank, sometimes provocative comments which we expect from him.

He considers the impact of television and broadcasting, of cinema and the popular newspapers with their vast circulations, on our mass thinking. He is often severely critical, but he does not endorse without reserve all the sweeping condemnations which the cultivated minority are apt to pass on mass communications. Indeed, the points he makes are all the more convincing because of his studied moderation and fairness.

He thinks that 'an undercurrent of rivalry between the churches and the educational system, on the one side, and mass communications, on the other, is already in movement. . . . A child brought to full maturity with no influence upon him other than school and church would differ considerably in mental outlook and in standards from one brought up under mass communications alone'.

Mr. Rhodes has, of course, no simple solution to this vast problem. But broadly speaking our task is to combat the tendency of mass communications to degrade the status of the human person. Even a 'religious revival' which was merely the result of a combined propaganda operation would be of dubious value.

F. H. Cleobury

The State and the Church in a Free Society, by A. Victor Murray (Cambridge University Press. 22s. 6d. Pp. 191).

The President of Cheshunt College, Cambridge, delivered these Hibbert Lectures for 1957 in the Universities of Sheffield, Southampton and Hull. Mr. Murray poses the problem of the person in the free society especially as it is focused in the changing character and relationships of Church and State. But he makes no attempt to relate this to the widespread discussions of this theme in aecumenical circles; one thinks, for instance, of all the thought that went into the concept of the responsible society at the Evanston Assembly of the World Council of Churches, of which he shows no awareness. The way to enjoy the book is to regard it as overhearing the best type of popular lecture in which a well stocked mind ranges widely over the current scene from a well marked point of view, that of one bred in English Nonconformity and relating itself to the changed social and ecclesiastical situation of the welfare state and the ecumenical movement. The book is very discursive to read; surprising juxtapositions of subject matter continually occur and it is the unity of point of view which holds the lectures together.

There are some serious inaccuracies, particularly in the section on Natural Law. Ecclesiastically a running fire is kept up against the Roman Catholic position, but rather at the expense of the whole concept of catholicism. Mr. Murray's attitude to the Church of England is generous but not always well informed. (The Lambeth Quadrilateral, for instance, is regarded as an Anglo-Catholic invention.) He is out of sympathy with the whole twentieth century move towards Christian unity; the penultimate section of the book is a deplorable treatment of the 'myth' of disunity in which denominationalism is justified on the principle of specialisation, a position which is un-Catholic and therefore un-Christian because it is un-Biblical.

RONALD PRESTON

The Bridge is Love, by Hans A. de Boer (Marshall Morgan and Scott. 15s.).

Hans de Boer is a German Christian who has travelled through Africa, Asia and U.S.A. This book consists of his impressions gained on his travels. Without confirming prejudices or handing out slick answers he records how the problems of our generation are being solved or intensified by Christians living as Christians or deceiving themselves that they are doing so. The book contains the observations of a German who combines sincere faith with objectivity and common sense.

H.C.S.

THE MODERN CHURCHMEN'S UNION

The Annual Sermon

The Dean of St. Paul's, the Very Rev. W. R. Matthews, K.C.V.O., D.D., will preach the Annual Sermon on Monday, 27th June at 1.15 p.m. at St. Margaret's Church, Lothbury, London, E.C.2. The subject will be 'The Revision of the Thirty-Nine Articles'.

The Annual Conference

Full details will be found in the enclosed leaflet. The Conference papers will be published in the next issue of *The Modern Churchman*.

The Annual Meeting will be held during the Conference at Newnham College, on Thursday, 4th August, at 5 p.m.

The Constitution rules that nominations (which should be seconded) should be sent to the Secretary by the 7th July. Members may nominate up to 4 candidates.

The following have served for three years on the Council and are not re-eligible till 1961.

Canon R. E. T. Allen
Rev. L. B. Cross
Rev. L. W. Cowie
Canon R. S. Dawson
Lt.-Col. H. H. King
Rev. F. I. L. Rees
Mrs. C. P. G. Rose
Miss M. I. Walker
Rev. W. T. P. Wheeler
Rev. D. E. H. Whiteley

Views of Local Branches

The London Branch held its Annual Dinner at Church House, Westminster on the 18th May. The Chairman and the Hon. Secretary spoke about the future plans of the Union.

Arnside (Lancs.) Branch met on the 21st May. Professor S. G. F. Brandon gave an address on the 'Origin of Religion in the Light of Recent Research'.

Hon. Secretary's Address

After the 15th July, the Hon. Secretary's address will be:

Caynham Vicarage,
Ludlow,
Shropshire.

Telephone: Ludlow 701.